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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
We are called upon once again to address litigation 
arising out of a tax avoidance scheme devised in the late 
1980s.1  Defendant James Barrett, a financial planner, 
induced the plaintiffs, four small New Jersey corporations and 
their respective owners, to adopt an employee welfare benefit 
plan known as the Employers Participating Insurance 
Cooperative (―EPIC‖).  EPIC‘s advertised tax benefits, the 
plaintiffs discovered years later, were illusory; the scheme 
masqueraded as a multiple employer welfare benefit plan, but 
in fact was a method of deferring compensation.  After the 
Internal Revenue Service audited the plaintiffs‘ plans and 
disallowed certain deductions claimed on their federal income 
tax returns, the plaintiffs initiated this suit against Barrett and 
other entities involved in the scheme.  They asserted claims 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(―ERISA‖), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461; the civil component of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(―RICO‖), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; and New Jersey statutory 
and common law.  A jury found Barrett liable on the 
plaintiffs‘ common law breach of fiduciary duty claim, but 
                                              
1
 This Court has, on at least three occasions, considered 
claims arising out of employee welfare benefit plans with tax 
avoidance features resembling the scheme at the root of this 
case.  See Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494 (3d 
Cir. 2006); Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm‘r, 299 F.3d 
221 (3d Cir. 2002); Faulman v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Life Ins. Co., 
353 F. App‘x 699, 2009 WL 4367311 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2009). 
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not liable on their RICO claim.  The District Court held a 
bench trial on the ERISA claim and issued partial judgment 
for the plaintiffs. 
 
The parties raise a litany of challenges to rulings made 
by the District Court over the course of the proceedings.  
Several of their claims present matters of first impression in 
this Circuit.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court in most respects.  On the issues of whether the 
District Court properly deemed certain state law causes of 
action preempted by ERISA, properly held certain ERISA 
claims time-barred, and properly limited the jury‘s 
consideration of one theory of recovery under RICO, we will 
vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I.
2
 
 
A. 
 
EPIC was a complex tax avoidance scheme designed 
to exploit 26 U.S.C. § 419A(f)(6), a tax code provision that 
exempts ―10-or-more-employer plans‖ from limitations on 
employers‘ deductions for contributions to employee welfare 
benefit plans.  See IRS Notice 95-34, 1995-1 C.B. 309.  
Promoters of EPIC marketed it to closely held corporations as 
a means of obtaining two attractive tax benefits:  pre-
retirement, it permitted employers to claim large deductions 
for contributions to employee benefit plans, and post-
retirement, it promised owner-employees a stream of tax-free, 
annuity-like payments.  Defendant Ronn Redfearn, a now-
deceased insurance salesman, created EPIC.  He formed 
defendant Tri-Core, Inc., a corporation that has since filed for 
bankruptcy protection, to administer employee benefit plans 
that conformed with EPIC‘s specifications.   
 
EPIC purported to be a multiple employer welfare 
benefit plan and trust, but in fact was an umbrella structure 
within which discrete employee welfare benefit plans 
operated.  To join EPIC, a participating corporation signed a 
standard form contract drafted by Tri-Core and titled the 
                                              
2
 We recount the facts based on the findings made by the       
District Court in the bench trial. 
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―EPIC Welfare Benefit Plan and Trust Adoption Agreement‖ 
(―Adoption Agreement‖).  An Adoption Agreement 
established an employee welfare benefit plan funded by 
employer contributions, set up a trust to hold plan assets, and 
generally bound the employer to the terms of participation in 
EPIC.  It denominated the employer as the plan fiduciary and 
administrator, but also required the employer to delegate 
―substantial ministerial functions‖ to Tri-Core.  In particular, 
Tri-Core was responsible for formulating rules necessary to 
administer the plans, determining employees‘ eligibility for 
benefits, processing claims, collecting and accounting for 
premiums, and directing others with respect to plan 
administration.  
 
Tri-Core selected two group term life insurance 
policies as the only investment vehicles for the plans.  The 
Inter-American Insurance Company of Illinois initially issued 
the policies, but after it declared bankruptcy in 1991, 
defendant Commonwealth Life Insurance Company 
(―Commonwealth‖) began issuing the policies.  One of the 
products, the Millennium Group 5 (―MG-5‖) policy, provided 
participants with a fixed pre-retirement death benefit, charged 
premiums commensurate with risk, and extended to 
participants an option to convert to an individual life 
insurance policy upon retirement or termination of 
employment.   
 
The second product was the continuous group (―C-
group‖) policy.  A C-group policy consisted of two phases:  
an accumulation phase and a payout phase.  In the 
accumulation phase, the employer made contributions (in the 
form of insurance premiums) to a group term life insurance 
policy that funded a guaranteed pre-retirement death benefit 
for an employee‘s beneficiaries.  The policies were valued at 
a multiple of the employee‘s most recent annual salary.  C-
group premiums far exceeded premiums for conventional life 
insurance policies, often by a multiple of four to six.  The 
portion of the premium necessary to fund the death benefit 
was set aside for that purpose.  The remainder of the premium 
— the  difference between the C-group premiums and the 
actual cost of insuring the employee‘s life — was reserved as 
so-called ―conversion credits.‖  Conversion credits were 
maintained in a ―premium stabilization reserve fund,‖ an 
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account that guaranteed policy holders a minimum interest 
rate.  
 
To transition to the payout phase, the employee could 
convert from the group term life insurance policy to an 
individual life insurance policy.  Conversion could occur 
under five circumstances, including retirement or termination 
of employment.  Upon conversion, the death benefit from the 
group policy would transfer to the employee‘s individual 
policy, as would conversion credits from the interest-bearing 
account.  The value of the transferred conversion credits was 
calculated at the time of conversion and was not guaranteed.  
A portion of the conversion credits was earmarked for 
lowering the post-retirement premium to the premium 
associated with the employee‘s age at the time of entry into 
EPIC rather than at the time of conversion.  Surplus 
conversion credits not necessary for keeping the policy in 
force were then made available to the employee, who could 
borrow against the policy at an interest rate identical to that of 
the interest-bearing account in which the conversion credits 
were held.  That is, the employee could withdraw funds from 
the policy as a loan that would never be repaid.  In this way, 
the employee could access, as tax-free income, excess funds 
paid as ―contributions‖ by the employer to the plan.   
 
As mentioned, EPIC called for establishment of a trust 
to hold and manage each plan‘s assets.  A number of banks 
were designated trustees of EPIC plans over the course of 
EPIC‘s operation.  In practice, Tri-Core, not the trustees, 
directed the management of plan assets; the trustee operated 
only as a pass-through entity.  When an employer adopted an 
EPIC plan, Tri-Core instructed the trustee to purchase the mix 
of MG-5 and C-group life insurance products selected by the 
employer.  The employer then deposited its contributions with 
the bank trustee on a biannual or quarterly schedule, and the 
trustee remitted the premiums to Commonwealth‘s general 
asset account.  Commonwealth thereafter placed a portion of 
the payments in the premium stabilization reserve fund.  
 
As the architect, promoter, and manager of EPIC, Tri-
Core received a commission from Commonwealth on each C-
group policy it sold.  Commonwealth paid Tri-Core out of its 
general asset account and set the commission rate at a 
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percentage of the employers‘ annual contributions.  Tri-Core 
typically received up to 85% of employer contributions in the 
first year of the policy and approximately 6% in subsequent 
years, and then redistributed part of its commission to the 
insurance broker who sold the EPIC plans.   
 
B. 
 
Redfearn enlisted defendant James Barrett in 1989 to 
market EPIC to closely held corporations with few employees 
and principals between the ages of 45 and 60.  At the time, 
Barrett was a financial planner employed by Cigna Financial 
Advisors, Inc.  In the years that followed, Barrett provided 
financial planning advice to each of the plaintiffs:  Michael 
Maroney, Sr. and Michael Maroney, Jr., executive officers of 
Universal Mailing Service, Inc. (collectively, the ―Universal 
Mailing plaintiffs‖); Jose Caria and Margit Gyantar, 
executive officers of Lima Plastics, Inc. (collectively, the 
―Lima Plastics plaintiffs‖);  Rocque Dameo and Daniel 
Dameo, executive officers of Finderne Management 
Company, Inc. (collectively, the ―Finderne plaintiffs‖); and 
Kenneth Fisher and Frank Panico, executive officers of Alloy 
Cast Products, Inc. (collectively, the ―Alloy Cast plaintiffs‖).3  
We hereinafter refer to the four corporations as the ―corporate 
plaintiffs‖ and the eight executive officers as the ―individual 
plaintiffs.‖ 
 
 Acting as Tri-Core‘s regional agent for New Jersey, 
Barrett introduced EPIC to the individual plaintiffs and 
recommended that their companies establish employee 
benefit plans within the EPIC umbrella.  Barrett plied them 
with projections of their tax-free retirement income, 
brochures and other marketing materials produced by Tri-
Core, and a legal opinion letter that vouched for the validity 
of the favorable tax benefits.
4
  Employers‘ inflated 
                                              
3
 Two additional plaintiffs, National Security Systems, Inc. 
and Steven Cappello, settled their claims and are not involved 
in this appeal. 
4
 Trial testimony disclosed Barrett‘s knowledge of a 
published article that questioned the validity of the EPIC 
model.  Appendix (―App.‖) 6649-52, 6659.  The District 
Court made no findings of fact with respect to Barrett‘s 
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contributions to the plans‘ group insurance policies, Barrett 
represented, were fully deductible as business expenses, and 
employees with C-group policies could expect tax-free 
retirement income.  Barrett did not explain that the 
conversion credits — the source of the projected post-
retirement income — were not guaranteed, but in fact were 
calculated by Tri-Core at the time of conversion. 
 
Finding Barrett persuasive, each of the corporate 
plaintiffs elected to establish an employee welfare benefit 
plan within EPIC.  They did so primarily because they 
believed that it would provide them a tax-advantageous way 
to save for retirement.  Between 1990 and 1992, each 
executed an Adoption Agreement with Tri-Core.  Per the 
Adoption Agreements, the corporate plaintiffs assumed the 
role of sponsor and administrator of their employee welfare 
benefit plans.  As administrators, they selected one of the two 
life insurance products designated by Tri-Core — the MG-5 
policy or the C-group policy — for each employee.  On 
Barrett‘s recommendation, the corporate plaintiffs purchased 
C-group policies for each of the individual plaintiffs and MG-
5 policies for other employees in the company.  In other 
words, the individual plaintiffs designed the plans to generate 
tax-free post-retirement income for themselves, but not for 
their employees.  As required by their Adoption Agreements, 
the corporate plaintiffs delegated most of their plan 
management and investment duties to Tri-Core.  
 
Tri-Core and Barrett (acting as an agent of Tri-Core) 
frequently sent the corporate plaintiffs invoices for their 
quarterly or biannual premiums.  They also collected the 
corporate plaintiffs‘ plan contributions and forwarded the 
payments to the trustees.  Barrett served as Tri-Core‘s contact 
person for the plaintiffs, fielding their inquiries about plans 
and benefits.  He was not named a fiduciary of the employers‘ 
plans, nor did he have discretion to manage or invest plan 
assets. 
 
The Universal Mailing and Alloy Cast plaintiffs were 
notified when they established their plans that Tri-Core would 
                                                                                                     
awareness that EPIC posed tax risks to participating 
employers. 
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receive a commission on the purchase of their life insurance 
contracts, but they were not provided information on the 
amount of the commission, who paid it, or how it was 
calculated.  From its commission, Tri-Core paid Barrett the 
equivalent of 40-50% of the corporate plaintiffs‘ first-year 
plan contributions and 3% of their contributions in 
subsequent years.  Barrett, in turn, distributed a portion of his 
commission to co-brokers.  Some of the plaintiffs were aware 
that Barrett received commissions, but he did not tell them 
how much he was paid or how his compensation was 
calculated.   
 
Between 1990 and 1997, the corporate plaintiffs each 
made contributions to their plans totaling several hundred 
thousand dollars.
5
  On their federal income tax returns, they 
deducted the contributions in full as ordinary and necessary 
business expenses pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 162.  In 1995, the 
Internal Revenue Service (―IRS‖) issued Notice 95-34, which 
concerned employer trust arrangements premised on the same 
scheme as EPIC.  See 1995-1 C.B. 309.  The Notice 
explained that the arrangements do not satisfy the 10-or-
more-employer-plan exemption provided by § 419A(f)(6) 
because they call for individual plans maintained by each 
employer.
6
  Employers, the IRS warned, should expect 
disallowance of deductions for contributions made to such 
plans.  The Notice characterized EPIC-style plans as 
providing deferred compensation subject to taxation. 
 
In 1997 and 1998, the IRS audited certain tax returns 
of each of the corporate plaintiffs.  Consistent with its 
position in the Notice, the IRS disallowed most of their 
deductions.
7
  Each corporate plaintiff incurred over $100,000 
in fees and taxes or penalties.
8
   
                                              
5
 The Lima Plastics plaintiffs contributed $726,001.00, the 
Alloy Cast plaintiffs $378,057.87, the Finderne plaintiffs 
$336,591.86, and the Universal Mailing plaintiffs 
$755,819.00.  
6
 The United States Tax Court endorsed this position in Booth 
v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 524, 571 (T.C. 1997). 
7
 In Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 
43 (T.C. 2000), the United States Tax Court considered two 
test cases involving a tax deferral scheme that mirrored EPIC.  
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II. 
 
A. 
 
The Finderne plaintiffs and Alloy Cast plaintiffs 
initiated separate actions in New Jersey Superior Court 
against Barrett and related defendants in 1999.  Asserting a 
number of state law claims, they alleged that Barrett‘s 
fraudulent misrepresentations about the tax benefits of the 
plan caused them substantial economic injury.  The trial 
judges in those actions issued judgments for the defendants 
on the basis that the claims were preempted by ERISA and 
that federal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over the 
ERISA claims.  Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 809 A.2d 842, 
847 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).   
 
The cases were consolidated on appeal and the 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court 
reversed, holding that ERISA did not preempt the state law 
claims.  Id. at 856.  The court first determined that although 
the EPIC structure itself was not a multiple employer 
employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA, each individual 
employer plan did constitute an ERISA employee benefit 
plan.  Id. at 850-51.  The court nevertheless determined that 
ERISA did not preempt the plaintiffs‘ state law claims 
because the harm alleged — reliance on misrepresentations 
about the tax benefits of the EPIC model made in the course 
of marketing EPIC — occurred before the corporate plaintiffs 
established their individual ERISA plans.  Id. at 855.  The 
challenged conduct, therefore, did not ―relate to‖ an ERISA 
plan.  Id. (applying 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).  Moreover, the 
court explained, Barrett‘s alleged misrepresentations that the 
plans would qualify for favorable tax treatment did ―not 
impact the structure or administration of the ERISA plans; 
                                                                                                     
The court upheld the Commissioner‘s disallowance of 
deductions and imposition of penalties on participant 
corporations.  We affirmed that decision.  Neonatology, 299 
F.3d at 233.   
8
 However, the District Court found that ―the effect of the IRS 
audit on the Finderne plaintiffs was not established at trial.‖  
App. 56 ¶ 46. 
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they [did] not relate to any state laws that regulate the type of 
benefits or terms of the ERISA plan; they [were] unrelated to 
laws creating reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting 
requirements or the plans; and they [did] not affect the 
calculation of plan benefits.‖  Id. at 855. 
 
On remand, the Finderne plaintiffs added a federal 
RICO claim which, along with a common law breach of 
fiduciary duty claim, was tried before a jury.  The jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and awarded 
approximately $70,000 in damages.  The judgment was 
affirmed on appeal.  Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 
940 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).  The Alloy Cast 
plaintiffs‘ case on remand was removed to federal court and 
consolidated with this case.  
 
B. 
 
In December 2000, the plaintiffs initiated this action in 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  The amended complaint asserted eighteen claims 
against seventeen defendants, but the only allegations 
relevant here are that Tri-Core and Barrett intentionally 
misrepresented or failed to disclose material information 
about EPIC.  In general, the claims fall into three substantive 
theories of liability.  Tri-Core and Barrett allegedly (1) 
misrepresented the tax risks and benefits of the plans, (2) 
concealed their extraction of commissions from the plaintiffs‘ 
contributions to the plans, and (3) misrepresented the ability 
of plan participants to access conversion credits in their 
premium rate stabilization funds.  Against Barrett, the 
corporate plaintiffs asserted claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2) 
and (a)(3) for violations of the duties imposed by ERISA §§ 
404, 405, and 406.  In addition, the plaintiffs asserted five 
civil RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), as well as nine 
state statutory and common law claims, including breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
 
The parties filed cross motions for partial summary 
judgment.  With respect to the Finderne plaintiffs, the District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Barrett on all 
claims that were or could have been asserted in the state court 
proceeding.  What remained were the Finderne plaintiffs‘ 
13 
 
ERISA claims, which survived because Congress vested 
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over most ERISA 
claims.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).   
 
The District Court next turned to Barrett‘s contention 
that he was not a proper defendant under ERISA § 502(a)(2) 
and (a)(3).  Barrett was not a fiduciary with respect to the 
plans, the court explained.  In effect, this legal conclusion 
necessitated the grant of summary judgment to Barrett on the 
§ 502(a)(2) claim, for that provision only provides a cause of 
action against ERISA fiduciaries.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 
1132(a)(2); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 252-53 
(1993).
9
  But Barrett‘s status as a nonfiduciary, the court 
continued, did not preclude potential liability under § 
502(a)(3), for that provision permits claims for equitable 
relief against knowing participants in a fiduciary‘s breach of 
its fiduciary obligations under ERISA.  By requesting 
disgorgement of Barrett‘s commissions, the court determined, 
the plaintiffs sought ―appropriate equitable relief‖ within the 
meaning of § 502(a)(3).  The court also rejected Barrett‘s 
argument that the ERISA claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1113 because no evidence 
revealed when the plaintiffs became aware of Tri-Core‘s 
commissions.  Finding a number of remaining disputes of 
material fact, the court denied the plaintiffs‘ motion for 
summary judgment on the § 502(a)(3) claim.   
 
Finally, the District Court addressed Barrett‘s 
argument that certain state law claims (asserted by the Alloy 
Cast, Lima Plastics, and Universal Mailing plaintiffs) were 
preempted by ERISA § 514(a).  Reasoning that state law 
claims based on misrepresentations made by Barrett about tax 
advantages did not ―relate to‖ the individual ERISA plans 
because they pre-dated the plans‘ formation, the court found 
no ERISA preemption.  The court next considered state law 
claims concerning Barrett‘s alleged misrepresentations about 
                                              
9
 Section 502(a)(2) extends a cause of action ―for appropriate 
relief‖ under ERISA § 409.  Section 409 makes a ―fiduciary 
with respect to a plan‖ personally liable for losses caused by 
its breach of fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA and 
permits a court to award ―equitable or remedial relief‖ against 
the fiduciary.  29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
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conversion credits and commissions made before and after 
the ERISA plans were established.  Because those claims 
―related to‖ alleged misconduct in the administration of the 
plans, the District Court held, they were preempted.  
 
C. 
 
The District Court bifurcated the claims into those that 
would be decided by a jury (the RICO and state law claims) 
and those that would be decided by the court in a bench trial 
(the ERISA claims).
10
  For the sake of judicial economy, the 
court held one two-week trial in November and December of 
2009.  As a result of the summary judgment ruling and the 
plaintiffs‘ withdrawal and settlement of claims, only the 
ERISA, RICO, and common law breach of fiduciary duty 
claims against Barrett remained by the end of the trial.  
Consistent with the rationale of the preemption ruling, the 
common law breach of fiduciary duty claim concerned only 
Barrett‘s alleged pre-plan misrepresentations about EPIC‘s 
tax benefits.  The ERISA claims were narrowed to Barrett‘s 
alleged participation in Tri-Core‘s breach of the fiduciary 
duties imposed by ERISA §§ 404(b) and 406(b).  Over the 
plaintiffs‘ objection, the District Court instructed the jury not 
to consider evidence pertaining to Tri-Core and Barrett‘s 
commissions in their deliberations on the RICO claim. 
 
The jury returned a verdict for Barrett on the RICO 
claim and for the plaintiffs on the common law breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.  It awarded the plaintiffs the damages 
they incurred as a result of the IRS audits:  $128,925 to the 
Alloy Cast plaintiffs, $133,415 to the Lima Plastics plaintiffs, 
and $176,643 to the Universal Mailing plaintiffs.  Barrett 
promptly requested apportionment of damages between 
Barrett and other tortfeasors — namely, Tri-Core and 
Redfearn.  Over the plaintiffs‘ objection, the court gave the 
instruction, and the jury determined that one half of the 
plaintiffs‘ loss was attributable to Tri-Core and Redfearn.  
                                              
10
 Because ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes only ―equitable 
relief,‖ no right to a jury trial attaches under the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Cox v. 
Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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That determination halved the damages recoverable from 
Barrett. 
 
The parties filed several post-trial motions.  In a series 
of decisions, the court granted Barrett‘s motion for judgment 
as a matter of law on the plaintiffs‘ demand for punitive 
damages; denied the plaintiffs‘ motion for a new trial on their 
civil RICO claims; and denied the plaintiffs‘ motion for 
judgment as a matter of law with respect to the jury‘s 
apportionment of damages. 
Some time later, the court issued its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law with respect to the ERISA claims.  As 
had been established by the summary judgment ruling, the 
claims only concerned misrepresentations made with respect 
to commissions and the accessibility of conversion credits, 
both of which occurred after the establishment of the plans.  
The court reiterated that while the EPIC framework was not a 
―multiple employer‖ welfare benefit plan within the meaning 
of ERISA § 3(40), each individual plan at issue in this case 
was covered by ERISA as a ―single-employer plan,‖ as 
defined by ERISA § 3(41).  See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(40), (41).   
 
Turning to the status of the defendants, the District 
Court reaffirmed that Tri-Core was a fiduciary under ERISA 
§ 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), but Barrett was not.  
The court determined that Barrett nevertheless could be held 
accountable under § 502(a)(3) if he knowingly participated in 
Tri-Core‘s violation of substantive ERISA provisions.  The 
District Court next ruled that Tri-Core breached its fiduciary 
obligations imposed by ERISA § 406(b)(3), but not §§ 
406(b)(1) or 404.  Taking the § 404 claim first, it explained 
that Tri-Core did not misrepresent the accessibility of 
conversion credits in the reserve fund because the plan 
documents clearly stated that no employee was entitled to 
employer contributions.  Nor did Tri-Core misappropriate 
plan assets for its own account, an act that would have 
violated § 406(b)(1), because Tri-Core was no longer a 
fiduciary when Commonwealth paid its commissions and 
Commonwealth did not pay its commissions out of plan 
assets.  Regarding the plaintiffs‘ theory that Tri-Core received 
excessive compensation, the court explained that the only 
relevant testimony in the record confirmed that the 
compensation was reasonable under industry norms.  Finally, 
16 
 
to the extent that § 404 imposed a duty on Tri-Core to 
disclose the fact and amount of its commissions, the court 
found that any nondisclosure did not harm the plaintiffs 
because the plans provided guaranteed benefits.  
 
Tri-Core‘s receipt of commissions from 
Commonwealth, however, did run afoul of § 406(b)(3), 
according to the District Court.  Section 406(b)(3), ERISA‘s 
anti-kickback provision, bars a fiduciary from receiving 
consideration in connection with a transaction involving plan 
assets.  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).  The District Court found that 
Tri-Core promoted Commonwealth‘s policies as investment 
vehicles for the plans knowing that it would draw a handsome 
salary from Commonwealth on each C-group policy it sold.  
This gave Tri-Core an incentive to recommend that the 
plaintiffs choose C-group policies as plan assets.  Indeed, 
EPIC depended on funding the plans with C-group policies.  
Section 406(b)(3), the court concluded, forbids this sort of 
symbiotic relationship between a plan fiduciary and an 
institution offering funding vehicles for the plan.   
 
The reasonableness of Tri-Core‘s commissions, the 
court next determined, was no defense.  Whether or not Tri-
Core‘s commissions were reasonable, § 406(b)(3) erects a 
categorical bar to such compensation.  The court found that 
an abundance of evidence established that Barrett knew about 
and actively assisted in Tri-Core‘s violation of § 406(b)(3).  
Accordingly, the court concluded that Barrett was liable 
under § 502(a)(3) for his knowing participation in Tri-Core‘s 
§ 406(b)(3) violation, and it issued judgment for the plaintiffs 
on that claim.  
 
Disgorgement of one-half of the commissions Barrett 
received in connection with his sale of EPIC to plaintiffs, the 
District Court determined, would most equitably remediate 
their injuries.
11
  Exercising its discretion, the court applied a 
                                              
11
 The court ordered Barrett to disgorge $15,508.97 to the 
Finderne plaintiffs, $41,634.35 to the Lima Plastics plaintiffs, 
$38,657.08 to the Alloy Cast plaintiffs, and $16,657.61 to the 
Universal Mailing plaintiffs. 
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prejudgment interest rate of 3.91%
12
 and declined to award 
the plaintiffs attorneys‘ fees and costs. 
 
Both parties moved to amend the judgment.  The 
District Court granted in part and denied in part the motions.  
Reversing its prior ruling, it held the Alloy Cast and 
Universal Mailing plaintiffs‘ ERISA claims were time-barred 
in light of evidence establishing their awareness, dating to 
1990, of Tri-Core‘s § 406(b)(3) violation.  The parties‘ 
remaining contentions, the court concluded, had already been 
resolved or were otherwise meritless.  The plaintiffs timely 
appealed and Barrett cross appealed. 
 
III. 
 
We have subject matter jurisdiction over this case 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  
Our appellate jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
―We exercise plenary review over a district court‘s 
summary judgment ruling.‖  Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation 
marks omitted).  ―Summary judgment is appropriate only 
where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.‖  Id.  In an appeal from an ERISA bench trial, 
we review the District Court‘s findings of fact for clear error 
and its conclusions of law de novo.  Vitale v. Latrobe Area 
Hosp., 420 F.3d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 
IV. 
 
Congress enacted ERISA ―to ensure the proper 
administration of pension and welfare plans, both during the 
years of the employee‘s active service and in his or her 
retirement years.‖  Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 
                                              
12
 The court borrowed the rate from that set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1961.  Its calculus resulted in $29,114.72 for the Finderne 
plaintiffs, $81,941.41 for the Lima Plastics plaintiffs, 
$76,329.75 for the Alloy Cast plaintiffs, and $29,458.71 for 
the Universal Mailing plaintiffs. 
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839 (1997).  Crafted to bring order and accountability to a 
system of employee benefit plans plagued by 
mismanagement, see Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 
112 (1989), ERISA is principally concerned with protecting 
the financial security of plan participants and beneficiaries.  
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845; Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).  To this end, the 
statute sets forth detailed disclosure and reporting obligations 
for plans and imposes various participation, vesting, and 
funding requirements.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1086; Morash, 
490 U.S. at 113. 
Relevant here, ERISA also prescribes standards of 
conduct for plan fiduciaries, derived in large part from the 
common law of trusts.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114; Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).  
Section 404 requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties 
―solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . 
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a 
like capacity‖ would use.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  
Supplementing that foundational obligation is § 406, which 
prohibits plan fiduciaries from entering into certain 
transactions.  Id. § 1106.  Subsection (a) erects a categorical 
bar to transactions between the plan and a ―party in interest‖ 
deemed likely to injure the plan.  Id. § 1106(a); Reich v. 
Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1995).
13
  Subsection (b) 
prohibits fiduciaries from entering into transactions with the 
plan tainted by conflict-of-interest and self-dealing concerns.  
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b); Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 
F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1987).  Section 408 offsets § 406 by 
creating exemptions from liability on certain transactions that 
would otherwise be prohibited.  29 U.S.C. § 1108.   
 
ERISA also aims ―to provide a uniform regulatory 
regime over employee benefit plans‖ in order to ease 
administrative burdens and reduce employers‘ costs.  Aetna 
                                              
13
 ERISA defines ―party in interest‖ to include nine classes of 
individuals or entities, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), but the general 
concept ―encompass[es] those entities that a fiduciary might 
be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan‘s 
beneficiaries.‖  Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith 
Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 242 (2000).  
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Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).  To ensure 
that plan regulation resides exclusively in the federal domain, 
Congress inserted in the statute an expansive preemption 
provision, codified at § 514(a).  See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 
(1981).  Congress paired § 514(a) with § 502(a), which 
enumerates a set of integrated civil enforcement remedies 
designed to redress violations of the statute or the terms of a 
plan.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  
 
All of these aspects of ERISA are at issue in this case.  
In the sections that follow, we address the plaintiffs‘ 
objections to the District Court‘s ruling on preemption, the 
amenability of Barrett to suit under ERISA for his 
participation in a violation of Tri-Core‘s fiduciary 
obligations, and the availability of various statutory defenses 
to liability.   We also examine the District Court‘s application 
of ERISA‘s statute of limitations and its award of equitable 
relief in favor of the plaintiffs. 
 
A. 
 
We begin with the plaintiffs‘ challenge to the grant of 
partial summary judgment in favor of Barrett on the basis that 
ERISA preempts a subset of the state law claims.
14
  The 
complaint alleged that Barrett induced the plaintiffs to 
participate in EPIC by misrepresenting the tax advantages of 
the plans, the accessibility of conversion credits,  the presence 
of a reserve fund, and the nature of the commissions he and 
Tri-Core anticipated earning.  It also alleged that Barrett 
encouraged the plaintiffs‘ ongoing participation in EPIC after 
the plans‘ adoption by continuing to misrepresent the 
accessibility of conversion credits within a reserve fund and 
by concealing information about the commissions he and Tri-
Core earned.  Insofar as the claims of fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, and conspiracy/aiding and 
abetting pertained to alleged misrepresentations about 
commissions, the accessibility of conversion credits, and the 
                                              
14
 We exercise plenary review over the legal question of 
ERISA preemption.  Barber v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
383 F.3d 134, 138 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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presence of a reserve fund, the District Court deemed them 
preempted.   
 
ERISA possesses ―extraordinary pre-emptive power.‖  
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).  Its 
broad preemptive scope reflects Congress‘s intent to lodge 
regulation of employee benefit plans firmly in the federal 
domain.  N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995).  
Consolidation of regulation and decisionmaking with respect 
to covered plans in the federal sphere, Congress anticipated, 
would promote uniform administration of benefit plans and 
avoid subjecting regulated entities to conflicting sources of 
substantive law.  Id. at 657.  This, in turn, would ―minimize 
the administrative and financial burden‖ imposed on 
regulated entities, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 
U.S. 133, 142 (1990), and expand employers‘ provision of 
benefits in light of the more predictable set of liabilities, Rush 
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002).  
What emerged from Congress‘s deliberations on ERISA was 
a statute that both preempts state law expressly and contains a 
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that preempts any 
conflicting state remedy.  Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 138-45; 
Barber, 383 F.3d at 138-41.
15
   
 
The District Court focused on express rather than 
conflict preemption, so we will begin by considering whether 
the District Court properly found the plaintiffs‘ state law 
causes of action expressly preempted.  Section 514(a) 
provides that ERISA ―shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan[.]‖  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  A ―State law‖ under 
the statute includes ―all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or 
other State action having the effect of law, of any State.‖  Id. 
§ 1144(c)(1).  State common law claims fall within this 
                                              
15
 Under the conflict preemption analysis, ―any state law 
cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the 
ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear 
congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive 
and is therefore pre-empted.‖  Davila, 542 U.S. at 209 (citing 
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 143-45; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987)).   
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definition and, therefore, are subject to ERISA preemption.  
See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140; Pilot Life Ins. Co 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).   
 
The term ―relate to‖ in § 514(a) is ―deliberately 
expansive.‖  Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 138; Pilot Life, 481 
U.S. at 46.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court cautions, its 
broad scope cannot ―extend to the furthest stretch of its 
indeterminacy‖; otherwise, ―for all practical purposes pre-
emption would never run its course.‖  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 
655.  The test for whether a state law cause of action 
―relate[s] to‖ an employee benefit plan is whether ―‗it has a 
connection with or reference to such a plan.‘‖  Egelhoff v. 
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (quoting 
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97).  The ―connection with‖ component of 
this test, however, supplies scarcely more content than the 
―relate to‖ formulation.  So, in applying the test, we must also 
look to ―‗the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the 
scope of the state law that Congress understood would 
survive,‘ as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law 
on ERISA plans.‖  Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement 
v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) 
(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-59).   
 
We are satisfied that the District Court correctly held 
the plaintiffs‘ common law claims were preempted to the 
extent they relate to Barrett‘s alleged misrepresentations, 
made after the plans‘ adoption, about commissions and the 
accessibility of conversion credits within a purported reserve 
fund.
16
  Those claims have ―a connection with‖ the ERISA 
plans because they are premised on the existence of the plans.  
See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140 (finding that a common 
law claim for wrongful discharge ―relates to‖ an ERISA plan 
because the cause of action ―is premised on[] the existence of 
a pension plan‖).  To prevail on those claims, the plaintiffs 
would have had to plead, and the court to find, that the plans 
were in fact adopted.  The court would then be called on to 
assess Barrett‘s representations in light of the plaintiffs‘ 
benefits and rights under the plans.  This type of analysis — 
                                              
16
 The plaintiffs do not contend that any of the claims survive 
by virtue of the insurance savings clause in § 514(b)(2)(A), 
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
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concerning the accuracy of statements made by an alleged 
(state law) fiduciary to plan participants in the course of 
administering the plans — sits within the heartland of ERISA.  
See, e.g., Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., LLC, 487 F.3d 139, 
149–50 (3d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that the calculation and 
payment of a benefit due to a plan participant goes to the 
essential function of an ERISA plan).  We therefore conclude 
that the plaintiffs‘ common law claims are preempted to the 
extent they relate to Barrett‘s conduct after he enrolled the 
plaintiffs in EPIC.   
We are left, then, with the plaintiffs‘ common law 
claims concerning Barrett‘s representations about the 
presence of a reserve fund, the accessibility of conversion 
credits, and the nature of his commissions made before the 
establishment of the plans.
17
  Those representations, plaintiffs 
allege, induced them to participate in EPIC.  Whether or not 
claims touching on those alleged misrepresentations are 
preempted requires us to confront the following question:  do 
common law claims that an insurance agent misrepresented 
the structure and benefits afforded by an ERISA plan in order 
to induce participation in that plan ―ha[ve] a connection with‖ 
the plan, such that they are preempted?   
 
In answering this question, we are not without 
guidance.  Several Courts of Appeals have held that an 
insurance agent who makes fraudulent or misleading 
statements to induce participation in an ERISA plan is 
amenable to suit under state law theories of recovery.  See, 
e.g., Woodworker‘s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 170 F.3d 985, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding the 
plaintiffs‘ fraudulent inducement claims not preempted 
because the actions had occurred before the defendant had 
become a fiduciary); Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713, 721 
(8th Cir. 1997) (finding that a state law claim of negligent 
misrepresentation was not preempted because allowing the 
plaintiff to recover for pre-plan tortious conduct would not 
prevent plan administrators from carrying out their duties and 
would not impose new duties on plan administrators); Coyne 
& Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1472 (4th Cir. 1996) 
                                              
17
 Neither Barrett nor the plaintiffs question the District 
Court‘s finding that the claims concerning Barrett‘s pre-plan 
promises of tax advantages were not preempted. 
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(finding a state law claim of professional negligence not 
preempted because ―the court‘s inquiry will be centered on 
whether the defendants‘ conduct comported with the relevant 
professional standard‖); accord Morstein v. Nat‘l Ins. Servs, 
Inc., 93 F.3d 715 (11th Cir. 1996); Perkins v. Time Ins. Co., 
898 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990).  Displacing claims of this 
variety, these courts reason, ―would not further Congress‘ 
purpose in passing ERISA.‖  Woodworkers, 170 F.3d at 991 
(citing Coyne & Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1466-71).  We agree.  
―Holding insurers accountable for pre-plan fraud does not 
affect the administration or calculation of benefits, nor does it 
alter the required duties of plan fiduciaries.‖  Id. (citing 
Wilson, 114 F.3d at 719; Coyne & Delaney Co., 98 F.3d at 
1471).  A state‘s common law, generally intended to ―prevent 
sellers of goods and services, including benefit plans, from 
misrepresenting . . . the scope of their services,‖ is ―‗quite 
remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly 
concerned — reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, 
and the like.‘‖  Wilson, 114 F.3d at 720 (quoting Dillingham, 
519 U.S. at 330). 
 
In our view, these sorts of claims rest on 
misrepresentations made about an ERISA plan before that 
plan‘s existence.  They are not premised on a challenge to the 
actual administration of the plan.  To the extent that a 
reviewing court would need to examine the provisions of the 
plan in considering the claims, it would be only to determine 
whether the representations made by Barrett regarding plan 
structure and benefits were at odds with the plan itself, or 
with the plaintiffs‘ understanding of the benefits afforded by 
the plans.  This is not the sort of exacting, tedious, or 
duplicative inquiry that the preemption doctrine is intended to 
bar.  To the contrary, that comparison requires only a cursory 
examination of the plan provisions and turns largely on ―legal 
duties generated outside the ERISA context.‖  Coyne & 
Delany Co., 98 F.3d at 1472.  Nor do we think these claims 
strike at that area of core ERISA concern — ―funding, 
benefits, reporting, and administration‖ — in which the use of 
state, rather than federal, law threatens to undermine the goals 
of Congress in enacting ERISA in the first place.  See 
Kollman, 487 F.3d at 149. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that ERISA does not 
preempt the plaintiffs‘ state law claims to the extent they 
allege that Barrett misrepresented the existence of a reserve 
fund, the availability of conversion credits, and the nature of 
his commissions before adoption of the EPIC plans.  To the 
extent it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Barrett 
on those theories of recovery, we will vacate the District 
Court‘s ruling and remand for further proceedings.  Retrial on 
these claims may be necessary.  However, the District Court 
may, on remand, consider other arguments pressed by the 
parties in dispositive motions or consider, among other issues, 
whether retrial on those claims would result in double 
recovery for a single injury.  We express no view on these 
matters. 
 
B. 
 
We turn next to Barrett‘s cross appeal, which 
challenges the District Court‘s threshold determination that 
Barrett is amenable to suit under ERISA § 502(a)(3) as a 
nonfiduciary who knowingly participated with Tri-Core in 
transactions forbidden by § 406(b)(3).  Section 406(b)(3) 
prohibits a fiduciary from ―receiv[ing] any consideration for 
his own personal account from any party dealing with [an 
ERISA plan] in connection with a transaction involving assets 
of the plan.‖  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).18  Section 502(a)(3) 
                                              
18
 Section 406(b) provides in full: 
 
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not— 
 
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own 
interest or for his own account, 
 
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act 
in any transaction involving the plan on behalf 
of a party (or represent a party) whose interests 
are adverse to the interests of the plan or the 
interests of its participants or beneficiaries, or 
 
(3) receive any consideration for his own 
personal account from any party dealing with 
25 
 
authorizes a civil action by ―a participant, beneficiary, or 
fiduciary‖ of an ERISA plan ―to obtain . . . appropriate 
equitable relief (i) to redress . . . violations [of Title I of 
ERISA or the plan] or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [Title I 
of ERISA] or the terms of the plan[.]‖  29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3).
19
  The plaintiffs‘ theory was that § 502(a)(3) 
enabled them to seek restitution from Barrett for an ―act or 
practice‖ that injured them — namely, Tri-Core‘s receipt of 
commissions from Commonwealth in connection with 
transactions involving plan assets.  Accepting the premise, the 
District Court deemed Barrett a proper defendant under § 
502(a)(3) as construed by the Supreme Court in Harris Trust 
                                                                                                     
such plan in connection with a transaction 
involving the assets of the plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b). 
19
 In relevant part, § 502(a) provides: 
 
A civil action may be brought—  
     
  . . . . 
 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates 
any provision of this subchapter or the terms of 
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate 
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or 
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter 
or the terms of the plan; 
  
. . . . 
  
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(b) of this section, by the Secretary (A) to 
enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain 
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress 
such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of 
this subchapter[.]  
 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
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& Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 
238 (2000).  Barrett maintains that a recent decision of this 
Court, Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011), 
clarifies that he cannot be held accountable under § 502(a)(3) 
because he is not a fiduciary or a party in interest to a 
transaction prohibited by ERISA § 406(a).
20
  To weigh these 
                                              
20
 Section 406(a) provides in full: 
 
Except as provided in section 1108 of this title: 
 
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not 
cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he 
knows or should know that such transaction 
constitutes a direct or indirect— 
 
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any 
property between the plan and a party in 
interest; 
(B) lending of money or other extension 
of credit between the plan and a party in 
interest; 
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or 
facilities between the plan and a party in 
interest; 
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the 
benefit of, a party in interest, of any 
assets of the plan; or 
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of 
any employer security or employer real 
property in violation of section 1107(a) 
of this title. 
 
(2) No fiduciary who has authority or discretion 
to control or manage the assets of a plan shall 
permit the plan to hold any employer security or 
employer real property if he knows or should 
know that holding such security or real property 
violates section 1107(a) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a). 
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competing positions, we must first step back and recount the 
pertinent cases construing § 502(a)(3). 
 
1. 
 
The Supreme Court first had occasion to construe § 
502(a)(3) in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 
(1993).  That suit arose out of the Kaiser Steel Corporation‘s 
inadequate funding of its ERISA-governed pension plan, 
resulting in termination of the plan and diminished payouts 
for beneficiaries.  Id. at 250.  A putative class of former 
Kaiser employees brought suit under § 502(a)(3) against 
Kaiser and Hewitt Associates, a nonfiduciary actuary whose 
acts and omissions allegedly caused Kaiser to miscalculate its 
funding obligations.  The plaintiffs sought equitable relief and 
money damages from Hewitt for its active participation in the 
plan fiduciaries‘ breach of legal duties.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court agreed to consider ―whether ERISA authorizes suits for 
money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly 
participate in a fiduciary‘s breach of fiduciary duty.‖  Id. at 
251. 
 
Within this question, the Court recognized, are two 
distinct issues.  The antecedent issue is whether a § 502(a)(3) 
claim may be asserted against a nonfiduciary that knowingly 
participates in a fiduciary‘s breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
secondary issue concerns the availability of money damages.  
Because the parties‘ briefs were directed primarily to the 
second question, the Court resolved only that issue, holding 
that ―appropriate equitable relief‖ under § 502(a)(3) does not 
encompass suits seeking compensatory damages from 
nonfiduciaries.  Id. at 254-55. 
 
Although it ―reserve[d] decision of th[e] antecedent 
question,‖ the Court took the opportunity to make some brief 
comments.  Id. at 255.  While certain ERISA provisions like § 
406(a) may by their plain text impose duties on 
nonfiduciaries, the Court observed, ―no provision explicitly 
requires them to avoid participation (knowing or unknowing) 
in a fiduciary‘s breach of fiduciary duty.‖  Id. at 254 & n.4.  
By contrast, the Court noted, ERISA § 405(a), the cofiduciary 
provision, ―does explicitly impose ‗knowing participation‘ 
liability on cofiduciaries.‖  Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 
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29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)).  In effect, the Court‘s dicta hitched 
defendant status in a § 502(a)(3) suit to the scope of ERISA‘s 
substantive provisions.  In so doing, it cast doubt upon the 
viability of suits proceeding on the theory that § 502(a)(3) 
provides a remedy for a nonfiduciary‘s knowing participation 
in a fiduciary‘s breach of a duty imposed by ERISA. 
 
We employed Mertens‘s dicta in Reich v. Compton, a 
case concerning a series of questionable transactions 
undertaken by an ERISA-governed union pension plan.  57 
F.3d at 272.  The Secretary of the Department of Labor sued 
the fiduciaries of the plan for breach of the duties imposed by 
ERISA §§ 404(a), 406(a), and 406(b).  The Secretary also 
asserted claims against two nonfiduciaries, alleging that they 
had knowingly participated in the fiduciaries‘ violations of 
their obligations under ERISA.  Compton, 57 F.3d at 273-74.  
The Secretary‘s cause of action against the nonfiduciaries 
arose under § 502(a)(5).  Id. at 281.  That provision replicates 
the language of § 502(a)(3) in all relevant respects, with the 
exception that it extends a cause of action to the Secretary 
instead of a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of the plan.  
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), with id. § 1132(a)(5).
21
 
 
The Secretary advanced two theories in support of his 
claims against the nonfiduciaries:  ―first, that section 
502(a)(5) authorizes him to sue nonfiduciaries who 
knowingly participate in breaches of fiduciary duty by 
fiduciaries and second, that section 502(a)(5) authorizes him 
to sue nonfiduciaries who participate in transactions 
prohibited by section 406(a)(1).‖  Compton, 57 F.3d at 281.  
Taking the theories in turn, we first rejected the Secretary‘s 
argument that § 502(a)(5) permits actions against 
nonfiduciaries charged solely with participating in a fiduciary 
breach.  Id. at 284.  Three decisions informed our analysis.  
First, because § 502(a)(5) mirrors § 502(a)(3), we relied 
heavily on the dicta in Mertens addressing the scope of § 
502(a)(3).  Id. at 282.  We explained that ―the Court 
expressed considerable doubt that section 502(a)(3) 
authorizes suits against nonfiduciaries who participate in 
                                              
21
 The Supreme Court instructs that the overlapping language 
in the two provisions ―should be deemed to have the same 
meaning.‖  Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260.  
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fiduciary breaches.‖  Id.  To the Secretary‘s contention that 
the plain language of § 502(a)(5) embraces a claim against a 
nonfiduciary to redress a fiduciary‘s breach of ERISA, we 
pointed out that the Courts of Appeals for the First and 
Seventh Circuits had already rejected that argument.  Id. at 
283-84 (citing Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754 
(7th Cir. 1994); Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1994)).  
Both Courts of Appeals, we observed, found the Mertens 
dicta convincing.  Id.; see also Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 
at 757; Rowe, 20 F.3d at 29-31.  We did not undertake an 
independent analysis of the statutory language, but rather 
rooted our holding in the reasoning of our sister Courts of 
Appeals and of the Supreme Court in Mertens.  Compton, 57 
F.3d at 284.   
 
The Secretary‘s second theory, which narrowly 
focused on the alleged breach of § 406(a), fared better.  
Section 406(a) disallows certain transactions between 
fiduciaries and parties in interest deemed likely to injure plan 
participants and beneficiaries.  29 U.S.C. § 1106(a); Harris 
Trust, 530 U.S. at 241-42.  We agreed with the Secretary that 
―a nonfiduciary that is a party to a transaction prohibited by 
section 406(a)(1) engages in an ‗act or practice‘ that violates 
ERISA‖ and may be subject to suit under § 502(a)(5).  
Compton, 57 F.3d at 287.  While acknowledging that § 
406(a)(1) on its face imposes a duty only on fiduciaries, we 
nevertheless credited the Supreme Court‘s suggestion in 
Mertens that the statute also imposes obligations on 
nonfiduciary ―part[ies] in interest‖ who participate in 
proscribed transactions.  Id. at 285 (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. 
at 253-54 & n.4).  Put another way, the ―party in interest‖ 
language in § 406(a)(1), rather than any language in § 
502(a)(5), supplied the textual hook for our conclusion that 
the nonfiduciaries were amenable to suit.  See id.  Our 
analysis comported with that of the Courts of Appeals for the 
First and Ninth Circuits, which likewise construed § 406(a)(1) 
to apply to nonfiduciaries.  Id. at 285-86 (citing Rowe, 20 
F.3d at 31 & n.7; Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 873-74 (9th 
Cir. 1988)). 
 
Five years later, the Supreme Court decided Harris 
Trust.  The question in that case was whether § 502(a)(3) 
authorizes a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of an 
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ERISA plan to seek equitable relief from a nonfiduciary party 
in interest to a transaction prohibited by § 406(a)(1).  Harris 
Trust, 530 U.S. at 241.  That is, the Court in Harris Trust 
considered the second question addressed in Compton, with 
the inconsequential distinction that the suit arose under § 
502(a)(3) rather than § 502(a)(5).  Like this Court in 
Compton, the Supreme Court answered that question in the 
affirmative.  Id.  Notable for our purposes here was the 
reasoning employed by the unanimous Court, which diverged 
from Compton in important respects.   
 
The case arose when the trustee of a pension plan 
alleged that another fiduciary purchased worthless interests in 
motel properties from a party in interest.  Id. at 242-43.  If 
proven, the transaction would have been a violation of § 
406(a).  The nonfiduciary seller of the interest in the motel 
properties persuaded the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit that § 502(a)(3) does not authorize a plan fiduciary to 
seek equitable relief from a party in interest to a transaction 
prohibited by § 406(a).  Id. at 244. 
 
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the 
observation that, by its terms, § 406(a) ―imposes a duty only 
on the fiduciary that causes the plan to engage in the 
transaction.‖  Id. at 245 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)).  This 
construction undercut one basis for our extension in Compton 
of § 502(a)(5) liability to a party in interest to a § 406(a) 
transaction:  the Supreme Court implicitly rejected its 
suggestion in Mertens that the text of § 406(a) anticipates 
liability for nonfiduciary parties in interest to § 406(a) 
transactions.   
 
Moving beyond § 406(a), the Court next explained that 
§ 502(a)(3), standing alone, imposes certain duties.  Id.  
Liability under § 502(a)(3), the Court emphasized, ―does not 
depend on whether ERISA‘s substantive provisions impose a 
specific duty on the party being sued.‖  Id.  Rather, 
―defendant status under § 502(a)(3) may arise from duties 
imposed by § 502(a)(3) itself.‖  Id. at 247.  Unlike other 
ERISA rights of action, § 502(a)(3) ―admits of no limit . . . on 
the universe of possible defendants.‖  Id. at 246.  Its focus ―is 
on redressing the ‗act or practice which violates any 
provision of [ERISA Title I].‘‖  Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 
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1132(a)(3)) (emphasis in original).  By carefully delineating 
three classes of plaintiffs but leaving defendant status open-
ended, the Court explained, § 502(a)(3) signals Congress‘s 
intent not to delimit categories of defendants subject to § 
502(a)(3) liability.  Id. at 247.  Instructive, too, was the 
common law of trusts, which had long countenanced suits for 
restitution or disgorgement against third parties who 
knowingly took trust property from a trustee in breach of the 
trustee‘s fiduciary duty.  Id. at 250. 
 
Confirming the Court‘s interpretation was ERISA § 
502(l), which requires the Secretary of Labor to ―assess a 
civil penalty against an ‗other person‘ who ‗knowing[ly] 
participat[es] in‘ ‗ any . . . violation of . . . part 4 [of ERISA 
Title I] . . . by a fiduciary.‖  Id. at 248 (paraphrasing 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(l)(1)-(2)) (alteration in original).
22
  The civil 
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 Section 502(l) provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) In the case of— 
 
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under 
(or other violation of) part 4 of this subtitle by a 
fiduciary, or 
 
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach 
or violation by any other person, 
 
the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such 
fiduciary or other person in an amount equal to 20 percent of 
the applicable recovery amount. 
 
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ―applicable 
recovery amount‖ means any amount which is 
recovered from a fiduciary or other person with respect 
to a breach or violation described in paragraph (1)— 
 
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with 
the Secretary, or 
 
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such 
fiduciary or other person to a plan or its 
participants and beneficiaries in a judicial 
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penalties recoverable under § 502(l) are defined by reference 
to amounts recoverable by the Secretary in § 502(a)(5) 
actions.  Id.  That reference led the Court to conclude that § 
502(a)(5) must authorize suits against any ―other person‖ who 
―knowing[ly] participat[es]‖ in a fiduciary‘s violation of her 
duties, ―notwithstanding the absence of any ERISA provision 
explicitly imposing a duty upon an ‗other person‘ not to 
engage in such ‗knowing participation.‘‖  Id.  And if the 
action was available under § 502(a)(5), it must also be 
available under § 502(a)(3).  Id. at 248-49.  Section 
―502(a)(3) (or (a)(5)) liability,‖ the Court concluded, does not 
―hinge[] on whether the particular defendant labors under a 
duty expressly imposed by the substantive provisions of 
ERISA Title I.‖  Id. at 249. 
 
Finally, the Court turned to reconcile this construction 
with Mertens.  The Court first rejected the implication in 
Mertens that an ―other person‖ under § 502(l) might be 
limited to cofiduciaries, who are expressly made liable by § 
405(a) for knowing participation in another fiduciary‘s breach 
of duty.  Id. at 249 (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261).  
Congress, the Court noted, defined ―person‖ in ERISA 
without regard to status as fiduciary, cofiduciary, or party in 
interest.  Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9)).  And, while a 
cofiduciary is a type of fiduciary, § 502(l) ―clearly 
distinguishes between ‗fiduciary‘ . . . and an ‗other person.‘‖  
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(1)(A) and (B)).  The Court 
dismissed as ―dictum‖ the portions of Mertens discussing § 
502(l) and the portion relied on by the courts in Compton, 
Rowe, and Continental Casualty Company to cast doubt on 
liability of nonfiduciaries under § 502(a)(3).  Id. (citing 
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255, 260-61).  
 
Several Courts of Appeals have considered whether 
the Court‘s holding in Harris Trust applies only to alleged 
violations of § 406(a) or whether it sweeps more broadly.  
Without exception, they have concluded that the Harris Trust 
                                                                                                     
proceeding instituted by the Secretary under 
subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.  
 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(l). 
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reasoning is not tethered to the limitations of § 406(a).  See 
Longaberger Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459, 468 n.7 (6th Cir. 
2009); Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits 
Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 353-54 
(5th Cir. 2003); Carlson v. Principal Fin. Grp., 320 F.3d 301, 
308 (2d Cir. 2003); McDannold v. Star Bank, N.A., 261 F.3d 
478, 486 (6th Cir. 2001).  More to the point, the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have stated directly 
that nonfiduciaries who are not parties in interest are proper 
defendants under § 502(a)(3) as construed by Harris Trust.  
Kolt, 586 F.3d at 468 n.7; Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 353-54. 
 
2. 
 
We turn now to consider whether Barrett is amenable 
to suit under § 502(a)(3) in view of the Supreme Court‘s 
reasoning in Harris Trust.  Barrett, we have noted, was found 
liable for his knowing participation in transactions forbidden 
by § 406(b)(3), which prohibits a ―fiduciary with respect to a 
plan‖ from ―receiv[ing] any consideration for his own 
personal account from any party dealing with such plan in 
connection with a transaction involving the assets of the 
plan.‖  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).  Several matters are not in 
dispute.  By accepting a salary from Commonwealth (a party 
dealing with the plans) in connection with its investment of 
plan assets in insurance policies issued by Commonwealth, 
the parties agree, Tri-Core (as fiduciary) contravened § 
406(b)(3).
23
  Nor is there a dispute on appeal that Barrett, 
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 Barrett does contend that because the plaintiffs selected the 
insurance policy for each employee — either a C-group or 
MG-5 policy — Tri-Core did not engage with 
Commonwealth in a transaction prohibited by § 406(b)(3).  
The argument is premised on a single unreported decision of 
this Court that involved the relationship between an insurance 
company and participants in a different EPIC plan.  See 
Faulman v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Life Ins. Co., 353 F. App‘x 699 
(3d Cir. 2009).  That situation is obviously distinct from the 
basis of liability in this case:  the relationship between a 
corporate fiduciary and an insurance company.  In any event, 
Barrett‘s argument finds no support in the text of § 406(b)(3) 
or in controlling precedent.  Whether or not the plaintiffs 
chose one of the two policies designated by Tri-Core as their 
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acting as a nonfiduciary, had knowledge of all of the 
circumstances surrounding Tri-Core‘s receipt of commissions 
from Commonwealth and participated in the transactions.  
The parties also agree that the plaintiffs have standing to 
bring the § 502(a)(3) claim and that their requested remedy is 
equitable in nature. 
 
The parties‘ consensus on these issues leaves us to 
consider only one narrow legal question:  is Barrett, a 
nonfiduciary who knowingly participated in a transaction 
prohibited by § 406(b)(3), amenable to suit under § 
502(a)(3)?  We hold that he is.  Tri-Core‘s receipt of 
compensation from Commonwealth in connection with its 
directed purchase of plan assets from Commonwealth was an 
act or practice prohibited by ERISA.  Operating in concert 
with Tri-Core, Barrett actively facilitated that act or practice.  
As the Court in Harris Trust explained, § 502(a)(3) provides a 
right of action against a transferee of ill-gotten trust assets 
who is a knowing participant in an ERISA violation.  530 
U.S. at 251.  It is of no consequence that Barrett was not a 
fiduciary and that his receipt of commissions was not itself a 
statutory violation, because liability under § 502(a)(3) ―does 
not depend on whether ERISA‘s substantive provisions 
impose a specific duty on the party being sued.‖  Id. at 245.  
As construed by the Court in Harris Trust, § 502(a)(3) 
provides the plaintiffs a cause of action to obtain equitable 
relief from Barrett for his knowing participation in Tri-Core‘s 
§ 406(b)(3) violation.  Id. at 245, 247, 250-51.   
 
 Barrett counters that our recent decision in Renfro 
undercuts this straightforward application of Harris Trust.  In 
Renfro, a putative class of participants in a 401(k) plan 
brought suit under § 502(a)(3) against Fidelity Management 
Trust Company, the manager and administrator of certain 
funds in the plan.  671 F.3d at 317-19.  They alleged that 
Fidelity‘s mismanagement of the plan‘s investment options 
amounted to a breach of the fiduciary duties of diligence and 
prudence imposed by ERISA § 404(a).  Fidelity moved to 
                                                                                                     
plan funding vehicles has no bearing on the propriety of Tri-
Core‘s receipt of compensation from Commonwealth in 
connection with its directed purchase of plan assets from 
Commonwealth.     
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dismiss on the basis that it was not a fiduciary with respect to 
the challenged conduct.  Both the District Court and this 
Court agreed.  Id. at 323.  But that did not end the inquiry, 
because the plaintiffs contended that even if Fidelity was a 
nonfiduciary, it was amenable to suit under § 502(a)(3) for its 
knowing participation in the plan fiduciary‘s breach of 
fiduciary duty under § 404(a).  We disagreed, holding that § 
502(a)(3) ―does not authorize suit against ‗nonfiduciaries 
charged solely with participating in a fiduciary breach.‘‖  Id. 
at 325 (quoting Compton, 57 F.3d at 284).  In arriving at that 
conclusion, we relied on the Mertens dicta and the portion of 
Compton finding no § 502(a)(5) cause of action against 
―‗nonfiduciaries charged solely with participating in a 
fiduciary breach.‘‖  Id. (quoting Compton, 57 F.3d at 284).  
In a brief footnote, we asserted that this reasoning accorded 
with Harris Trust.  Id. at 325 n.6.  We characterized Harris 
Trust as consonant with our holding in Compton that § 
502(a)(3) ―authorized suits for nonfiduciary participation by 
parties in interest to transactions prohibited under ERISA.‖  
Id. at 325 n.6.  So framed, § 502(a)(3) did not supply a cause 
of action against Fidelity because the ―plaintiffs d[id] not 
appear to contend the Fidelity entities were parties in interest 
to a prohibited transaction.‖  Id. 
 
 Barrett urges us to read Renfro as establishing a firm 
rule that a nonfiduciary may only be subjected to suit under § 
502(a)(3) if she knowingly participates as a party in interest 
in a § 406(a) transaction.  We do not think this expansive 
reading of Renfro is compatible with Harris Trust.  As an 
initial matter, Renfro was a § 404 breach of fiduciary duty 
case, not a § 406 prohibited transaction case, and the 
provisions safeguard the rights of plan participants and 
beneficiaries in distinct ways.  Section 404 codifies the 
fiduciary‘s ―general duty of loyalty to the plan‘s 
beneficiaries.‖  Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 241-42.  It springs 
from the common law of trusts, which likewise charged 
fiduciaries with a duty of loyalty.  See Pegram v. Herdrich, 
530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000) (citing 2A A. Scott & W. Fratcher, 
Trusts § 170, p. 311 (4th ed.1987)).  Section 406(b)(3), at 
issue in this case, is among the prophylactic rules listed in § 
406.  Section 406(a) ―categorically bar[s] certain transactions 
deemed ‗likely to injure the . . . plan.‘‖  Harris Trust, 530 
U.S. at 242 (quoting Comm‘r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 
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Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993)).  And § 406(b) categorically 
bars certain transactions likely to generate self-dealing, a 
practice detrimental to plan participants and beneficiaries.  
Compton, 57 F.3d at 287.  Both provisions ―appl[y] 
regardless of whether the transaction is ‗fair‘ to the plan.‖  Id. 
at 288.   
 
The congruity of the prohibited transaction provisions 
leaves no logical basis for distinguishing between 
nonfiduciaries‘ knowing participation in § 406(b) transactions 
and nonfiduciaries‘ knowing participation in § 406(a) 
transactions.  Accord LeBlanc v. Cahill, 153 F.3d 134, 153 
(4th Cir. 1998) (finding no reason why, in a § 502(a)(3) 
action, ―allowing equitable relief to be obtained from 
nonfiduciary parties in interest who participated in a 
transaction prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1) would be any 
different if the transaction were prohibited under ERISA § 
406(b)(2) or § 406(b)(3)‖).  Harris Trust, a § 406(a) case, is 
the controlling precedent here; this Court‘s reasoning in 
Renfro is inapt for § 406(b) transactions.  Our narrow holding 
in Renfro, applying to ―nonfiduciaries charged solely with 
participating in a fiduciary breach,‖ see 671 F.3d at 325, is 
limited in scope to nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate 
in a § 404 breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
We have still a more fundamental disagreement with 
Barrett‘s position.  His interpretation of Harris Trust and 
Renfro hinges on the ―party in interest‖ language in § 406(a).  
That textual hook, the argument goes, justified the Supreme 
Court‘s willingness to subject nonfiduciaries who knowingly 
participate in fiduciaries‘ violations of ERISA to § 502(a)(3) 
suits.  Like the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits, see Kolt, 586 F.3d at 468 n.7; Bombardier, 354 F.3d 
at 353-54, we do not read Harris Trust as limited in reach 
only to cases involving § 406(a) transactions between a 
fiduciary and a party in interest.  The Court‘s reasoning in 
Harris Trust relied on a textual analysis of § 502(a)(3), its 
analogue in § 502(a)(5), and the reference in § 502(l) to § 
502(a)(5).  Defendant status under § 502(a)(3), the Court 
explained, arises from § 502(a)(3) itself, not from the 
permutations of the various substantive provisions in ERISA 
Title I.  Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 245, 249.  That the 
nonfiduciary defendant was a ―party in interest‖ was beside 
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the point; under § 502(a)(3), it was an ―other person‖ that 
participated in a forbidden ―act or practice‖ and therefore was 
amenable to suit.  Id. at 245 n.2, 248.  Barrett, too, is an 
―other person,‖ as defined in § 502(l), who knowingly 
participated in a fiduciary‘s breach of a provision of ERISA 
Title I.  See id. at 248. 
 
Finally, our suggestion in Renfro that Harris Trust 
applies only to nonfiduciary parties in interest to § 406(a) 
transactions is dicta.  And to the extent that Renfro is 
inconsistent with the reasoning in Harris Trust, we must 
follow the Supreme Court over our own precedent.  See 
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541-42 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We have no occasion today to reconsider whether Renfro 
accurately reflects the construction given to § 502(a)(3) in 
Harris Trust.  It is enough to say that § 406(b) prohibited 
transactions are more akin to § 406(a) prohibited transactions 
than to § 404 breaches of fiduciary duty.  Because that is so, 
we follow the Court‘s guidance in Harris Trust in holding that 
Barrett was amenable to suit under § 502(a)(3) for his 
knowing participation in Tri-Core‘s violation of § 406(b)(3). 
 
C. 
 
Even if Tri-Core‘s receipt of commissions from 
Commonwealth ran afoul of § 406(b)(3), Barrett argues in the 
alternative, the undisputed reasonableness of its commissions 
precludes liability.  He points to ERISA § 408(b)(2) and 
(c)(2), provisions he reads to exempt reasonable 
compensation tainted by self-dealing from the reach of § 
406(b)(3).  The plaintiffs respond that § 406(b)(3) establishes 
a per se prohibition on kickbacks and related behavior, 
regardless of the reasonableness of compensation.  Finding 
the plaintiffs‘ position convincing, the District Court 
concluded that § 406(b) enumerates per se violations, the 
reasonableness of which is immaterial.  We agree. 
 
To determine if § 408(b)(2) or (c)(2) excuse Tri-Core‘s 
§ 406(b)(3) violation, we must ―examine first the language of 
the governing statute, guided not by ‗a single sentence or 
member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the provisions of the 
whole law, and to its object and policy.‘‖  John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 
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(1993) (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51) (alterations in 
original).  Section 406(b)(3), as we have noted, provides that 
―[a] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not . . . receive any 
consideration for his own personal account from any party 
dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction 
involving the assets of the plan.‖  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).  
Section 408(b)(2) provides 
 
The prohibitions provided in section 1106 of 
this title shall not apply to any of the following 
transactions: . . . (2) Contracting or making 
reasonable arrangements with a party in interest 
for office space, or legal, accounting, or other 
services necessary for the establishment or 
operation of the plan, if no more than 
reasonable compensation is paid therefor.  
 
Id. § 1108(b)(2).  And § 408(c)(2) provides, in relevant part,  
Nothing in section 1106 of this title shall be 
construed to prohibit any fiduciary from . . . (2) 
receiving any reasonable compensation for 
services rendered, or for the reimbursement of 
expenses properly and actually incurred, in the 
performance of his duties with the plan; except 
that no person so serving who already receives 
full time pay from an employer or an 
association of employers, whose employees are 
participants in the plan, or from an employee 
organization whose members are participants in 
such plan shall receive compensation from such 
plan, except for reimbursement of expenses 
properly and actually incurred[.] 
 
Id. § 1108(c)(2). 
 
We begin with Barrett‘s effort to invoke § 408(b)(2) as 
a defense to liability.  Section 408(b)(2), by its plain terms, 
applies only to ―transactions . . . with a party in interest.‖  Id. 
§ 1108(b)(2).  ERISA § 406(a) proscribes transactions with 
―part[ies] in interest,‖ but § 406(b) does not.  It follows that § 
408(b)(2) provides an exemption for § 406(a) transactions, 
but not for § 406(b) transactions.  Accord Patelco Credit 
Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 910 (9th Cir. 2001); Daniels v. 
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Nat‘l Employee Benefit Servs., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 684, 693 
(N.D. Ohio 1994); Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 
1263-64 (D.N.J. 1980).  The Department of Labor, the agency 
charged with administration and enforcement of Title I of 
ERISA, agrees.  It explains that § 408(b)(2) ―exempts from 
the prohibitions of section 406(a) of the Act payment by a 
plan to a party in interest, including a fiduciary,‖ but ―does 
not contain an exemption from acts described in section 
406(b)(1) . . . , section 406(b)(2) . . . or section 406(b)(3)[.]‖  
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b–2(a).  Barrett‘s liability derives from 
his knowing participation in a § 406(b) transaction.  Hence, § 
408(b)(2) provides him no defense to liability. 
 
The question of whether § 408(c)(2) confers a 
―reasonable compensation‖ defense on a § 406(b)(3) violator 
requires more discussion.  We are concerned here with the 
interaction between two statutes, but first consider the 
language Congress used in crafting § 406(b)(3).  Speaking 
unequivocally, § 406(b)(3) commands that fiduciaries ―shall 
not‖ receive consideration in connection with a transaction 
involving plan assets.  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).  It does not 
purport to forbid fiduciaries from extracting only 
unreasonable consideration from transactions involving plan 
assets.  To the contrary, it disallows ―any consideration,‖ no 
matter how reasonable or inconsequential.  Read most 
naturally, § 406(b)(3) is a flat prohibition on a fiduciary‘s 
receipt of consideration in connection with a transaction 
involving plan assets.  We have previously construed § 
406(b)(2), another of the stringent self-dealing prohibited 
transactions, in the same manner.  Section 406(b)(2), we 
explained, is a ―blanket prohibition,‖ Compton, 57 F.3d at 
287, one that ―creates a per se proscription on the type of 
transaction in question,‖ see Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 
523, 528 (3d Cir. 1979).  Even when a transaction discloses 
―no taint of scandal, no hint of self-dealing, no trace of bad 
faith‖ and involves ―fair and reasonable‖ terms, § 406(b)(2) 
admits of no exceptions.  Cutaiar, 590 F.2d at 528.
24
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 Construing § 406(b)(2) in Cutaiar v. Marshall, we 
acknowledged that under § 408(a), the Secretary of the 
Department of Labor may grant an exemption from the 
strictures of § 406(b) so long as the exemption is published in 
the Federal Register and a public hearing is held on the 
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Section 406(b) differs from its neighbor § 406(a) in 
this regard.  Section 406(a) prohibits fiduciaries from causing 
the plan to engage in certain transactions with parties in 
interest, ―[e]xcept as provided in section [408].‖  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1106(a).  But § 406(b) contains no corresponding 
reference to § 408.  To avoid rendering the prefatory clause in 
§ 406(a) mere surplusage, see Board of Trustees of the Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011), we must give meaning to this 
discrepancy in the § 406 subsections.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that by prefacing § 406(a), 
but not § 406(b), with a qualification, Congress tempered § 
406(a) transactions, but not § 406(b) transactions, with § 408 
exemptions.  See Sahni, 262 F.3d at 910.  We agree that this 
is the most sensible construction of these incongruous 
provisions.  By expressly limiting liability under § 406(a) by 
reference to the exemptions in § 408, then removing the same 
limiting principle from § 406(b), Congress cast § 406(b) as 
unyielding.25 
 
Barrett urges us to pay no mind to the language of § 
406(b), and instead probe only the plain text of § 408(c)(2).  
Regardless of the character of the § 406(b) prohibitions, he 
contends, § 408(c)(2) insulates Tri-Core from liability so long 
as its compensation is reasonable.  At first blush, his 
construction of § 408(c)(2) has some appeal:  the provision 
declares, without limitation, that ―nothing‖ in § 406 — 
                                                                                                     
matter.  590 F.2d at 530.  Section 408(a)‘s burdensome 
procedures, we reasoned, were indicia of Congress‘s ―intent 
to create, in [§] 406(b), a blanket prohibition of certain 
transactions, no matter how fair, unless the statutory 
exemption procedures are followed.‖  Id.  We emphasized, 
―[E]ach plan deserves more than a balancing of interests.  
Each plan must be represented by trustees who are free to 
exert the maximum economic power manifested by their fund 
whenever they are negotiating a commercial transaction.‖  Id. 
25
 A number of district courts have reached the same 
conclusion.  See LaScala v. Scrufari, 96 F. Supp. 2d 233, 239-
40 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Daniels, 858 F. Supp. at 693; Whitfield 
v. Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287, 1303-04 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); 
Gilliam, 492 F. Supp. at 1263-64; Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. 
Supp. 341, 353-54 (W.D. Okla. 1978).   
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subsection (a) or (b) — can prohibit a fiduciary from 
receiving reasonable compensation for servicing the plan.  29 
U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2).  But Barrett ignores the remainder of § 
408(c)(2), which in substance is an exception to that broad 
general rule.  Under § 408(c)(2), persons receiving full-time 
pay from an employer whose employees are plan participants 
―shall not receive compensation from such plan.‖  Id.  The 
exception speaks to a matter left unaddressed by the general 
pronouncement — that is, from whom are they prohibited 
from receiving reasonable compensation?  A fiduciary that 
falls under the exception cannot receive compensation ―from 
such plan.‖  This language permits an inference that § 
408(c)(2) is concerned only with fiduciaries‘ receipt of 
compensation from plans, not from other companies in which 
the fiduciary invests plan assets. 
 
By focusing on a particular class of entities that may 
compensate fiduciaries, the exception may shed light on the 
scope of § 408(c)(2)‘s general rule.  But it does not do so 
unambiguously.  Read in conjunction with the exception, the 
general rule applies only to reasonable compensation paid to a 
fiduciary by a plan.  See Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1216 n.4 
(―[S]ervices exempted under ERISA Section 408(c)(2) are 
services rendered to a plan and paid for by a plan for the 
performance of plan duties, not services rendered to 
companies in which a plan invests funds that are paid for by 
those companies.‖).  Read as a standalone requirement, on the 
other hand, the general rule exempts a fiduciary from the 
strictures of § 406(b) so long as compensation is reasonable.  
See Harley v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 909 
(8th Cir. 2002) (construing  § 408(c)(2) to unambiguously 
and ―sensibly insulate[] the fiduciary from liability [for a § 
406(b) violation] if . . . compensation [is] . . . reasonable‖).  
Against the backdrop of these dueling constructions – both 
plausible – we conclude that § 408(c)(2) is ambiguous.  
Compounding that ambiguity is the unsettled relationship 
between § 408(c)(2) and the self-dealing prohibitions of § 
406(b) – a relationship informed by Congress‘s omission of 
any reference to § 408 in § 406(b).  
 
It is well settled that ―when a statutory provision is 
ambiguous, Chevron, [U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)] dictates that we 
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defer to the agency‘s reasonable construction of that 
provision.‖  Cheng v. Att‘y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Because we have concluded above that § 408(c)(2) is 
ambiguous, we look to the Department of Labor‘s 
construction of the statute.  The Department interprets § 
408(c)(2) as a provision that ―clarif[ies] what constitutes 
reasonable compensation for such services,‖ but not as an 
independently operative reasonable-compensation exception.  
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2(a).  This reading of § 408(c)(2) is a 
reasonable construction of the statute insofar as it relates to 
the § 406(b) prohibited transactions.  The ―crucible of 
[Congress‘s] concern [in enacting ERISA] was misuse and 
mismanagement of plan assets.‖  Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 n.8.  
One facet of plan misuse particularly troubling to Congress 
was self-dealing by fiduciaries.  N.L.R.B. v. Amax Coal Co., 
453 U.S. 322, 333-34 (1981).  Construing § 408(c)(2) to 
shield self-dealing fiduciaries with a defense whenever 
reasonable sums change hands would undercut Congress‘s 
goal of stamping out conflict-of-interest tainted behavior.  Cf. 
Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1221.  This case illustrates the point.  
Whether or not Tri-Core‘s compensation was reasonable, the 
steady inflow of payments from Commonwealth rewarding 
each sale of a C-group policy may have compromised its best 
judgment as fiduciary.  Skewed judgment of this order ranked 
among the principal abuses motivating Congress to include 
the § 406(b) provisions in ERISA in the first place.  It is 
reasonable for the Department of Labor, tasked with 
implementing § 408(c)(2) in a manner that effectuates 
Congress‘s intent, to interpret it as a clarifying provision. 
 
Deferring, as we do, to the Department of Labor‘s 
view that § 408(c)(2) is not an independent reasonable 
compensation exemption, we hold that it affords Barrett no 
defense to liability for knowingly participating in Tri-Core‘s 
§ 406(b)(3) violation.   
 
D. 
 
We turn now to the plaintiffs‘ challenge to the District 
Court‘s rejection of their alternative theories of recovery on 
their § 502(a)(3) claim against Barrett.  The District Court 
found that Tri-Core‘s receipt of commissions violated § 
406(b)(3), but concluded that Tri-Core did not otherwise 
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breach fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA §§ 404 and 
406(b)(1).
26
  Had the District Court determined that Tri-Core 
violated § 404 or § 406(b)(1) and that Barrett knowingly 
participated in Tri-Core‘s conduct, the plaintiffs posit, it 
might have ordered full, rather than partial, disgorgement of 
Barrett‘s ill-gotten commissions.  We will affirm the District 
Court‘s rejection of the plaintiffs‘ alternative theories of 
recovery.  
 
1. 
 
Section 406(b)(1) prohibits a ―fiduciary with respect to 
a plan‖ from ―deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own 
interest or for his own account.‖  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1).  At 
trial, the plaintiffs argued that Tri-Core, acting as a fiduciary, 
violated § 406(b)(1) by misappropriating a portion of their 
plan contributions as commissions.  They understood their 
contributions as ―assets of the plan‖ and saw 
Commonwealth‘s payment of commissions to Tri-Core from 
its general asset account as Tri-Core‘s act of self-dealing.  
The District Court rejected the argument, citing two 
independent reasons.  First, by the time the corporate 
plaintiffs‘ contributions reached Commonwealth‘s 
commingled general asset account, the court explained, Tri-
Core no longer had discretion and control over those assets, 
and therefore was no longer a fiduciary under ERISA § 
3(21)(A).  Second, the court reasoned, the contributions were 
no longer plan assets once they were placed in 
Commonwealth‘s general asset account.  In the court‘s view, 
ERISA § 401(b)(2), the insurer exemption codified at 29 
                                              
26
 The District Court appears to have analyzed the § 406(b)(1) 
theory in its general discussion of whether the plaintiffs 
established a § 404 violation.  But it clearly addressed the 
plaintiffs‘ argument that Tri-Core‘s alleged misappropriation 
of plan assets as commissions constituted self-dealing.  On 
appeal, Barrett and the plaintiffs treat this discussion as the 
court‘s ruling on the § 406(b)(1) theory.  Therefore, 
notwithstanding the District Court‘s failure to label its 
analysis as falling under the rubric of § 406(b)(1), we will 
address it as such here. 
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U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2), shielded the corporate plaintiffs‘ 
contributions from classification as plan assets.
27
  Under 
either rationale, Tri-Core did not violate § 406(b)(1) (and 
Barrett by extension did not knowingly participate in Tri-
Core‘s violation of § 406(b)(1)) because the statute covers 
only fiduciaries‘ handling of plan assets. 
 
The plaintiffs maintain on appeal that the second basis 
for the court‘s rejection of their § 406(b)(1) theory was error.  
That is, they object to the court‘s application of the insurer 
exemption to the facts of this case.  But they do not challenge 
the District Court‘s first holding that Tri-Core lacked 
discretionary authority over their assets in Commonwealth‘s 
general asset account when Commonwealth arranged for 
payment of commissions to Tri-Core.  Because that holding 
constituted an independent basis for the District Court‘s 
decision, the plaintiffs cannot prevail even if we were to 
disagree with the applicability of insurer exemption to these 
circumstances.  
 
In any event, we agree with the District Court that Tri-
Core lacked control and discretionary authority over the plan 
assets in Commonwealth‘s general asset account, and 
therefore was no longer a fiduciary.  Under ERISA § 
3(21)(A), an entity is a fiduciary with respect to a plan if it (i) 
―exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or disposition of 
its assets‖ or (ii) ―renders investment advice for a fee or other 
compensation . . . or has any authority or responsibility to do 
so,‖ or (iii) ―has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan.‖  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(21)(A).  An entity can be a fiduciary with respect to 
certain plan activities, but not with respect to others.  Renfro, 
671 F.3d at 321.  Thus, in every case concerning a fiduciary‘s 
obligations under ERISA, the threshold question is whether 
some person or entity ―was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was 
                                              
27
 ERISA contains no comprehensive definition of ―plan 
assets,‖ but gives content to the term through certain 
exclusions.  John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 89, 95.  Section 
401(b)(2), the insurer exemption, is one such exclusion.     
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performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action 
subject to complaint.‖  Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226. 
 
No record evidence shows that Tri-Core managed the 
investment of the plan contributions or otherwise rendered 
investment advice once the contributions reached 
Commonwealth.  True, Tri-Core directed the trustees‘ 
handling of the contributions.  But Tri-Core did not direct 
Commonwealth with respect to its handling of the 
contributions once they became commingled in its general 
asset account.  Moreover, as the District Court observed, 
there was neither an allegation nor evidence that Tri-Core and 
Barrett failed to remit the full value of the corporate 
plaintiffs‘ contributions to the trustee.  Had Tri-Core siphoned 
off a percentage of the contributions as compensation before 
transmitting the balance to the trustee, it might then have 
exercised discretionary authority over the assets within the 
scope of ERISA‘s definition of a plan fiduciary.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  And under those circumstances, the 
plaintiffs‘ § 406(b)(1) theory very well might prevail.  But 
that is not the case before us.  Because we agree that Tri-Core 
was not a fiduciary with respect to plan assets by the time 
Commonwealth paid it commissions, we will affirm the 
rejection of the plaintiffs § 406(b)(1) theory.
28
 
                                              
28
 One might wonder how, under the District Court‘s 
rationale, Tri-Core was a fiduciary with respect to the § 
406(b)(3) transactions, but not with respect to the § 406(b)(1) 
transactions.  The answer lies in the wording of the 
provisions.  The District Court concluded, and Barrett does 
not dispute, that Tri-Core acted in a fiduciary capacity when it 
received consideration from Commonwealth ―in connection 
with a transaction involving assets of the plan,‖ in violation of 
§ 406(b)(3).  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).  In connection with the 
relevant transaction in the § 406(b)(3) claim — Tri-Core and 
Barrett‘s recommendation that the corporate plaintiffs adopt 
plans funded with Commonwealth‘s insurance policies — 
Tri-Core did exercise discretion and control over what 
became plan assets, knowing all the while that it would 
receive compensation from Commonwealth for its 
recommendation.  But by the time Commonwealth generated 
the commission — the relevant transaction for the § 406(b)(1) 
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2. 
 
A fiduciary‘s duties of loyalty and prudence under 
ERISA § 404 encompass a duty to communicate candidly, 
Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1012 (3d Cir. 
1997), and to not ―‗materially mislead those to whom the 
duties of loyalty and prudence are owed,‘‖ In re Unisys Corp. 
Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 579 F.3d 220, 228 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 
475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000)).  The plaintiffs argued at trial that 
Tri-Core infringed these duties in several respects.  On 
appeal, they only seriously dispute the District Court‘s 
rejection of their theory that the Department of Labor‘s 
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (―PTE 84-24‖)29 
supplements the § 404 duties and that Tri-Core failed to 
comply with PTE 84-24.  Like the District Court, we think the 
plaintiffs‘ reliance on PTE 84-24 is misplaced.  PTE 84-24, 
much like ERISA § 408, provides conditional exemptions 
from § 406 prohibited transaction restrictions.  It does not 
create independent affirmative duties.  In attempting to 
shoehorn PTE 84-24 into the substantive duties imposed by § 
404, the plaintiffs misconstrue the narrow function of the 
exemption.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s 
rejection of the plaintiffs‘ § 404 theory of recovery. 
 
E. 
 
The plaintiffs next object to the District Court‘s post-
trial ruling that ERISA‘s statute of limitations barred the 
claims asserted by the Universal Mailing and Alloy Cast 
plaintiffs against Barrett.  The court determined that, in 1990, 
the principals of those corporations signed a disclosure form 
attached to the Adoption Agreement that notified them of Tri-
Core‘s commissions from Commonwealth.  The form 
provided: 
 
                                                                                                     
theory — Tri-Core no longer exercised discretion over the 
plan assets. 
29
 49 Fed. Reg. 13208 (1984), as amended by 71 Fed. Reg. 
5887 (2006). 
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The Insurer, as defined in the Plan document, is 
an Insurance Company(ies) selected by Tri Core 
to provide various Life Insurance Contracts.  Tri 
Core will receive a commission on the purchase 
of Life Insurance Contracts.  The Insurer is not 
in any way related to Tri Core.   
 
App. 3841 (example of disclosure form); 3844 (Michael 
Maroney‘s signature); 3858 (Kenneth Fisher‘s signature).30  
That disclosure, the District Court held, gave the Universal 
Mailing and Alloy Cast plaintiffs actual knowledge of Tri-
Core‘s § 406(b)(3) breach and started the statute of 
limitations clock on any claim to redress the violation.   
 
ERISA‘s statute of limitations provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
No action may be commenced . . . with respect 
to a fiduciary‘s breach of any responsibility, 
duty, or obligation under this part . . . after the 
earlier of 
 
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action 
which constituted a part of the breach or 
violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the 
latest date on which the fiduciary could have 
cured the breach or violation, or 
 
(2) three years after the earliest date on which 
the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach 
or violation.  
 
29 U.S.C. § 1113.  This provision ―offers a choice of periods, 
depending on ‗whether the plaintiff has actual knowledge of 
the breach.‘‖  Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 
511 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kurz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 
1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996)).  ―[A]ctual knowledge of a breach 
or violation requires that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of 
all material facts necessary to understand that some claim 
exists.‖  Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1177 (3d Cir. 
                                              
30
 The parties did not locate similar forms from the Finderne 
and Lima Plastics plaintiffs.  
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1992) (punctuation omitted).  ―[W]here a claim is for breach 
of fiduciary duty, to be charged with actual knowledge 
‗requires knowledge of all relevant facts at least sufficient to 
give the plaintiff knowledge that a fiduciary duty has been 
breached or ERISA provision violated.‘‖  Cetel, 460 F.3d at 
511 (quoting Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1178).   
 
 The Universal Mailing and Alloy Cast plaintiffs 
contend that they did not have ―actual knowledge‖ of Tri-
Core‘s breach in 1990 because they did not know at that time 
that Tri-Core was a fiduciary.  This argument is meritless.  In 
the very same disclosure form that alerted the Universal 
Mailing and Alloy Cast plaintiffs to Tri-Core‘s commission, 
they delegated to Tri-Core responsibility for administration of 
their plans.  See App. 3841 (―The Plan Administrator has 
delegated his duties under the Trust to Tri Core. . . .  Tri Core 
has agreed to serve as the Plan Administrator‘s delegatee.‖).  
Having ceded to Tri-Core discretionary authority to manage 
and administer plan assets, they plainly were aware that Tri-
Core was a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA § 3(21).  
 
The District Court‘s finding of actual knowledge 
nevertheless was clearly erroneous for a different reason.  
Barrett‘s liability under § 502(a)(3) was premised on his 
knowing participation in Tri-Core‘s receipt of commissions.  
The disclosure form gave the Universal Mailing and Alloy 
Cast plaintiffs actual knowledge in 1990 of all facts necessary 
to understand that an ERISA claim could be lodged against 
Tri-Core.  What matters here is whether they had actual 
knowledge of all material facts necessary to appreciate that a 
claim against Barrett existed.  The District Court did not 
consider when the Universal Mailing and Alloy Cast 
plaintiffs acquired actual knowledge that Barrett participated, 
knowingly, in Tri-Core‘s receipt of compensation from 
Commonwealth.  Absent any consideration of those facts, the 
District Court clearly erred in finding that, by 1990, plaintiffs 
had actual knowledge of all facts necessary to establish a § 
502(a)(3) claim against Barrett.  Accordingly, we will vacate 
the District Court‘s partial grant of Barrett‘s motion to amend 
the judgment on the Universal Mailing and Alloy Cast 
plaintiffs‘ ERISA claims and remand for consideration of 
when they acquired actual knowledge of Barrett‘s knowing 
participation in Tri-Core‘s breach of § 406(b)(3). 
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F. 
 
Finally, both parties dispute the District Court‘s 
rulings on remedies.  The plaintiffs contend that the District 
Court erred in (1) awarding restitution of only half of 
Barrett‘s commissions; (2) imposing a prejudgment interest 
rate commensurate with the interest rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1961; and (3) declining to award attorneys‘ fees and costs.  
Barrett‘s cross appeal contends that the District Court erred in 
awarding any prejudgment interest.   
 
1. 
 
To remedy Barrett‘s violation of § 502(a)(3), the 
District Court awarded the plaintiffs restitution of half of the 
commissions Barrett received in connection with his sale of 
C-group policies.  The court reached this conclusion by 
considering the nature of Barrett‘s liability.  Barrett‘s receipt 
of commissions from Commonwealth (by way of Tri-Core) 
was not itself a violation of § 406(b)(3), but rather derived 
from his knowing participation in Tri-Core‘s § 406(b)(3) 
violation.  In addition, Barrett passed along 50% of his 
commissions to others with whom he worked.  For these 
reasons, the District Court deemed it most equitable to order 
Barrett to disgorge some, but not all, of the compensation he 
received for his sale and management of the plaintiffs‘ plans.  
The plaintiffs contend that the District Court should have 
awarded full disgorgement of Barrett‘s commissions because 
the common law authorized recovery of all profits obtained 
by wrongful conduct.  Barrett responds that partial 
disgorgement was an appropriate equitable remedy under § 
502(a)(3) because he was entitled to some compensation for 
the services he rendered.
31
 
 
―[A]ppropriate equitable relief‖ under § 502(a)(3), the 
Supreme Court instructs, ―refer[s] to ‗those categories of 
relief that were typically available in equity[.]‘‖  Great-West 
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-10 
(2002) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256) (emphasis in 
                                              
31
 Neither party has suggested that the relief fashioned by the 
District Court conflicts with the terms of the plans. 
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original); see also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 
1878 (2011); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 
356, 361-62 (2006).  To determine if a form of relief was 
typically available in equity we consult well-known treatises 
and the Restatements.  Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217.  Those 
sources help decipher whether, ―[i]n the days of the divided 
bench,‖ a remedy was equitable in nature, in which case it 
may be redressed by a § 502(a)(3) action, or legal in nature, 
in which case it may not.  Id. at 212.   
 
It is undisputed that restitution of ill-gotten 
commissions is an equitable remedy.  The Restatement of 
Restitution provides, ―where a fiduciary in violation of his 
duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or 
commission or other profit, he holds what he receives upon a 
constructive trust for the beneficiary.‖  Restatement of 
Restitution § 197, at 808 (1937).  This rule applies even when 
the fiduciary‘s disloyal enrichment causes the beneficiary no 
harm.  Id. § 197, at 809-10, cmt. c.  ―The rule . . . is not based 
on harm done to the beneficiary in the particular case, but 
rests upon a broad principle of preventing a conflict of 
opposing interests in the minds of fiduciaries, whose duty it is 
to act solely for the benefit of their beneficiaries.‖  Id.  The 
Restatement of Trusts is in accord:  when a fiduciary receives 
a commission from an insurance company in exchange for 
purchasing insurance policies as trust assets, ―he is 
accountable for the commission.‖  Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 170, at 370-71, cmt. o (1959). 
 
These authorities instruct that had Tri-Core, as 
fiduciary, remained in the suit as a defendant, its commissions 
acquired from Commonwealth in breach of § 406(b)(3) would 
be subject to a constructive trust for the plaintiffs, who would 
be entitled to restitution of the payments.  See Harris Trust, 
530 U.S. at 250 (―The trustee or beneficiaries may . . . 
maintain an action for restitution of the property (if not 
already disposed of) or disgorgement of proceeds (if already 
disposed of), and disgorgement of the third person‘s profits 
derived therefrom.‖).  But what of Barrett, a third party who 
accepted what he knew to be commissions, obtained in breach 
of § 406(a)(3)?  Here again, the Restatement of Restitution is 
instructive:  
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Where property is held by one person upon a 
constructive trust for another, and the former 
transfers the property to a third person who is 
not a bona fide purchaser, the interest of the 
beneficiary is not cut off . . . .  In such a case he 
can maintain a suit in equity to recover the 
property from the third person, at least if his 
remedies at law are not adequate. 
 
Restatement of Restitution § 160, at 647, cmt. g; see also id. § 
201, at 813-14.  The plaintiffs‘ interest in the constructive 
trust placed over Tri-Core‘s commissions, the Restatement 
suggests, is not diminished because Tri-Core transferred a 
portion of its commissions to Barrett.  On this understanding, 
Barrett should be held accountable for the commissions he 
knowingly received by way of Tri-Core‘s fiduciary breach.  
Cf. Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 213-14 (analyzing the constructive 
trust remedy and concluding that, in a case involving unpaid 
benefits, ―Dobbs, Palmer, and the Restatement all make clear 
that the constructive trust remedy typically would allow [the 
beneficiary], in equity, to force [the plan administrator] to 
disgorge the gain it received on his withheld benefits under a 
restitutionary theory‖). 
 
We now reach the nub of the controversy:  did the 
District Court have discretion to halve the commissions 
recoverable from Barrett?  ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes 
suits for ―appropriate equitable relief.‖  29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3) (emphasis added).  Our Court recently construed 
the term ―appropriate‖ to confer discretion on district courts, 
sitting as courts of equity, to limit equitable relief by 
doctrines and defenses traditionally available at equity.  US 
Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 676 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3638 (U.S. Jun. 25, 2012) 
(No. 11-1285).  It is a bedrock principle of equity that courts 
possess discretion to limit equitable relief.  See, e.g., 1 Dan B. 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.4(1), at 91-92 (2d ed. 1993).  
Equitable discretion enables a court to shape relief ―to fit its 
view of the balance of the equities and hardships,‖ id. § 2.4(1) 
at 92, and to fashion relief tailored to the unique 
circumstances of a case.  See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 
1944 (2011) (―Once invoked, the scope of a district court‘s 
equitable powers . . . is broad, for breadth and flexibility are 
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inherent in equitable remedies.‖); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010) (―[W]e have . . . made clear that often 
the ‗exercise of a court‘s equity powers . . . must be made on 
a case-by-case basis.‘‖ (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
360, 375 (1964))).   
 
In limiting the plaintiffs‘ recovery to partial 
disgorgement of Barrett‘s ill-gotten commissions, the District 
Court did precisely what equity enables it to do:  it exercised 
its discretion not to award complete relief after balancing the 
equities and hardships.  It was within the District Court‘s 
discretion under § 502(a)(3) to consider the role that Barrett 
played as a nonfiduciary with respect to the plaintiffs‘ plans 
and the amount of commissions he actually retained.  See 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.4(5), at 109-10; see also Amara, 
131 S. Ct. at 1880 (referring to a district court‘s ―discretion 
under § 502(a)(3)‖).  In light of Barrett‘s comparatively 
minor role in the underlying ERISA violation and his 
redistribution of a portion of the commissions to co-brokers, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 
Barrett to disgorge some, but not all, of his compensation for 
marketing and servicing the plaintiffs‘ plans.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the award of restitution. 
 
2. 
 
The District Court also awarded the plaintiffs 
prejudgment interest on the disgorged commissions.  Section 
502(a)(3) authorizes a court to award prejudgment interest as 
a form of appropriate equitable relief.  Fotta v. Trs. of the 
United Mine Workers of Am., 319 F.3d 612, 616 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Both parties object to the prejudgment interest rate 
applied by the District Court.  We review such challenges for 
abuse of discretion.  Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 133 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Prejudgment interest exists to make plaintiffs whole 
and to preclude defendants from garnering unjust enrichment.  
Id. at 132.  Recognizing these goals, the District Court first 
explained that prejudgment interest was ―not necessarily 
required‖ to make the plaintiffs whole.  App. 71.  This was so 
because, in the court‘s view, the plaintiffs received all 
benefits to which they were entitled under their plans and 
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because Tri-Core‘s commissions came from 
Commonwealth‘s general asset fund, not directly from the 
plans.  On the other hand, the District Court reasoned, some 
prejudgment interest was necessary to prevent Barrett from 
unjustly retaining compensation from transactions that plainly 
conflicted with the plans‘ interests.  Balancing these equities, 
the District Court imposed a modest prejudgment interest rate 
of 3.91%.  It borrowed this rate from the post-judgment 
interest rate set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 and applied the average 
rate from the time the plaintiffs established the plans to the 
date of the order.  
 
The plaintiffs contend that the District Court should 
have awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of return of a 
typical retirement account because their money would have 
earned interest at that rate had it been invested in a tax-
compliant vehicle.  This may be so, but Barrett‘s knowing 
participation in Tri-Core‘s receipt of commissions — the 
basis for ERISA liability — has little to do with whether the 
plaintiffs selected the best investment vehicle for retirement 
savings.  The plaintiffs offer no argument that calls into 
question the District Court‘s conclusion that, because they 
received the benefits to which they were entitled under the 
plans, prejudgment interest was unnecessary to fully 
compensate their injuries.   
 
Barrett contends that because the District Court found 
that prejudgment interest was not needed to make the 
plaintiffs whole, they should not have been awarded interest 
on Barrett‘s commissions.  That argument neglects that 
prejudgment interest aims to make plaintiffs whole and to 
prevent unjust enrichment.  Holmes, 213 F.3d at 132.  
Alternatively, relying on a denial-of-benefits case, Barrett 
argues that because his commissions were reasonable, there 
was no unjust enrichment.  The argument misapprehends the 
nature of the ERISA violation for which he was found liable.  
Section 406(b) enumerates per se harms, the commission of 
which is itself a wrong, irrespective of the reasonableness of 
the ill-gotten profits.  The mere fact of Barrett‘s knowing 
participation in the § 406(b) violation indicates that, to some 
extent, both Barrett and Tri-Core were unjustly enriched by 
their self-dealing.  For the same reason, Barrett‘s final 
argument — that he did not act wrongfully — is baseless.  
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Neither parties‘ objections to the prejudgment interest 
rate are persuasive.  We have emphasized that, in reviewing a 
District Court‘s assignment of prejudgment interest, ―what 
matters is . . . whether its balancing of the equities amounted 
to an abuse of discretion.‖  Id.; see also Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts § 207(1), at 468 (―Where the trustee commits a 
breach of trust and thereby incurs a liability for a certain 
amount of money with interest thereon, he is chargeable with 
interest at the legal rate or such other rate as the court in its 
sound discretion may determine[.]‖).  The District Court 
thoughtfully weighed the interests in making the plaintiffs 
whole and in avoiding Barrett‘s unjust enrichment.  Its 
application of a modest prejudgment interest rate was not an 
abuse of discretion.  
 
3. 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to 
attorneys‘ fees and costs.  ERISA provides that a ―court in its 
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney‘s fee and costs of 
action to either party.‖  29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).  The Supreme 
Court construes this provision to permit a district court to 
award fees and costs to any party that has achieved ―‗some 
degree of success on the merits.‘‖  Hardt v. Reliance Standard 
Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010) (quoting 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)).  Once 
satisfied that a party has met that threshold standard, the court 
must consider the following policy factors in determining 
whether to award fees and costs:   
 
(1) the offending parties‘ culpability or bad 
faith; (2) the ability of the offending parties to 
satisfy an award of attorneys‘ fees; (3) the 
deter[r]ent effect of an award of attorneys‘ fees 
against the offending parties; (4) the benefit 
conferred on members of the pension plan as a 
whole; and (5) the relative merits of the parties‘ 
position.   
 
Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983).  
We review a challenge to a district court‘s allocation of 
counsel fees and costs for abuse of discretion.  MacPherson v. 
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Employees‘ Pension Plan of Am. Re-Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 253, 
256 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
The District Court considered each of the discretionary 
factors before denying the plaintiffs‘ request for fees and 
costs.  In the court‘s view, Barrett was minimally culpable 
when compared with Redfearn, the mastermind behind EPIC, 
and Tri-Core, the entity that breached its fiduciary duties.  In 
addition, the court found, imposition of fees would have 
negligible deterrent effect, many of the plaintiffs‘ claims 
lacked merit, and the case conferred no benefit on the plans, 
for the plans were inoperative by the close of the trial.  
Weighing against those considerations, the court reasoned, 
was Barrett‘s ability to satisfy a fee award.  Because this 
factor did not counterbalance the other four, however, the 
court declined to award fees and costs under § 1132(g)(1). 
 
The plaintiffs contest the District Court‘s application 
of the Ursic factors to the factual record.  While they construe 
the evidence differently, they fall short of establishing that the 
District Court abused its discretion in balancing the factors.  
The court thoughtfully considered each factor, and its 
characterization of the evidence is well founded in the record.  
We will affirm its denial of attorneys‘ fees and costs. 
 
V. 
 
The plaintiffs mount a number of challenges to rulings 
made by the District Court with respect to the civil RICO and 
common law breach of fiduciary duty claims.  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Barrett on the former and the 
plaintiffs on the latter.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the verdict on the RICO claim and remand for retrial.  
We will affirm in all other respects.  
 
A. 
 
The plaintiffs‘ principal objection to the District 
Court‘s rulings in the jury trial involves the jury charge on the 
civil RICO claim against Barrett.  After the parties rested, the 
court determined that it would instruct the jury not to consider 
evidence concerning Barrett‘s receipt of commissions in its 
assessment of the RICO claim.  App. 7707-08; 7769.  We 
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review the propriety of this instruction for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Livingstone v. N. Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 524 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The RICO statute provides a civil cause of action to 
―[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of 
violation of section 1962 of this chapter.‖  18 U.S.C. § 
1964(c).  Section 1962, which contains RICO‘s criminal 
provisions, makes it ―unlawful for any person employed by or 
associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise‘s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt.‖  18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  The Supreme Court 
has distilled the provision into four components:  ―(1) conduct 
(2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering 
activity.‖  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 
(1985).
32
   
 
―Racketeering‖ may include mail or wire fraud under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).  The 
plaintiffs based their RICO claim on these predicate offenses.  
The elements of mail and wire fraud are (1) a scheme or 
artifice to defraud for the purpose of obtaining money or 
property, (2) participation by the defendant with specific 
intent to defraud, and (3) use of the mails or wire 
transmissions in furtherance of the scheme.  United States v. 
Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 187-88 & n.14 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus, 
the plaintiffs maintained that Barrett was associated with Tri-
Core, an enterprise, and participated in its pattern of 
committing mail and wire fraud through a specific scheme to 
defraud.  
 
The plaintiffs‘ theories as to what constituted Tri-
Core‘s ―scheme to defraud‖ had a chameleonic quality 
throughout the proceedings.  By the time of trial, they had 
                                              
32
 The complaint initially asserted five RICO claims alleging 
separate theories of enterprise.  By the time of trial, the claims 
were narrowed to the single theory that Tri-Core operated as 
an enterprise within the meaning of RICO.  Barrett does not 
challenge this characterization of Tri-Core on appeal. 
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settled on four general formulations of the alleged scheme:  
(1) Barrett and Tri-Core misled the plaintiffs into 
participating in EPIC in order to generate grossly excessive 
compensation for themselves; (2) Tri-Core and Barrett misled 
them into participating in EPIC by concealing the 
commissions they would receive; (3) Tri-Core and Barrett 
misled them into participating in EPIC by misrepresenting the 
tax benefits and drawbacks of the plan; and (4) Tri-Core and 
Barrett misled them into participating in EPIC by 
misrepresenting the existence of a reserve fund and the 
accessibility of conversion credits.  The plaintiffs encouraged 
the District Court to charge the jury that it could find any one 
of the alleged schemes constituted a scheme to defraud. 
 
Before charging the jury, however, the District Court 
announced that it would limit the jury‘s consideration of both 
theories involving Barrett‘s receipt of commissions.  That is, 
it would not permit the jury to find a scheme to defraud based 
on the plaintiffs‘ first or second theory.  Accordingly, the 
District Court instructed the jury: 
 
You should know that I will be deciding the 
issues plaintiffs have raised regarding the 
defendants‘ commissions.  You‘ve heard a lot 
of questions about how much and when and so 
forth and so on.  All right.  Those issues you 
will not be deciding one way or another.  So 
you should disregard all testimony regarding 
the commissions received by the defendant.  
You will concentrate on the other issues raised 
by the plaintiffs. 
 
App. 7769.  In place of the commissions theories, the District 
Court instructed, the jury could rely only on the following to 
determine whether the plaintiffs established a scheme to 
defraud:  
 
The plaintiffs allege that Barrett committed the 
following racketeering acts; that defendant 
Barrett used the mails to further a fraudulent 
scheme or artifice to sell insurance through 
misrepresentations which involved preparing 
promotional materials that contain[ed] 
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affirmative misrepresentations, and omitted to 
disclose material information, the sending of 
money through the mails and the distributions 
of money in the form of contributions and 
otherwise to defraud plaintiffs and others 
regarding the tax benefits of an employee 
welfare benefit plan. 
 
App. 7775-76.  The plaintiffs objected and argued that by 
paring down the instruction and taking from the jury the 
question of whether excessive or concealed commissions 
amounted to a scheme to defraud, the District Court 
―eviscerated‖ their RICO claim.  Reply Br. 24.33 
 
 We begin by considering the plaintiffs‘ objection to 
the excision of the excessive compensation theory from the 
jury charge.  The District Court did not instruct the jury to 
decide if Barrett and Tri-Core extracted excessive 
commissions because it believed the plaintiffs presented no 
evidence that Tri-Core and Barrett‘s commissions were 
excessive by industry standards.  The court reasoned that ―the 
amount of the commissions in this case . . . cannot be 
characterized,‖ and the plaintiffs‘ failure to adduce any such 
evidence left nothing for the jury to consider.  App. 7707-08.  
On appeal, the plaintiffs protest that there was 
―overwhelming‖ evidence that the commissions were 
excessive.  Reply Br. 21.  But they fail to identify a single 
item of evidence from which a juror could conclude that Tri-
Core and Barrett misrepresented information in order to 
generate unreasonably high compensation.
34
  Nor does our 
                                              
33
 Barrett argues in passing, and without legal citation, that it 
was ―necessary to instruct the jury to disregard commissions 
evidence since the district court would be considering that in 
connection with the ERISA claim.‖  Barrett Br. 25.  We see 
no reason, however, why the plaintiffs cannot recover under 
both ERISA and RICO for harms derived from Tri-Core and 
Barrett‘s receipt of commissions from Commonwealth.  It 
bears repeating that ERISA § 502(a)(3) allows for only 
equitable relief.  The civil RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 
1964(c)), on the other hand, authorizes treble damages. 
34
 The plaintiffs‘ only argument in this regard is: ―Barrett‘s 
commissions were clearly excessive based on the facts that 
59 
 
review of the record reveal a basis on which a jury could find 
Tri-Core and Barrett‘s compensation disproportionately high 
compared to relevant industry standards.  In light of this 
failure of proof, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to instruct the jury to consider whether Barrett 
generated excessive commissions as part of a scheme to 
defraud.  
 
 The District Court‘s excision of the concealed 
compensation theory from the jury charge presents a more 
difficult issue.  We have not located any explanation in the 
record for the court‘s decision not to permit the jury to 
consider the theory.  Nor has Barrett pointed us to any basis 
for the decision.  Concealment of material facts in order to 
obtain money through such concealment, the plaintiffs 
correctly argue, may constitute fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1341 and 1343.  United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 249 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Indeed, we have explained that the mail fraud 
statute ―‗has been expansively construed to prohibit all 
schemes to defraud by any means of misrepresentation that in 
some way involve the use of the postal system.‘‖  United 
States v. Olatunji, 872 F.2d 1161, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 925 (3d Cir. 
1982)).  There was conflicting evidence at trial about whether 
Tri-Core and Barrett made sufficient disclosures to the 
plaintiffs about the source and quantity of their compensation.  
And there was an adequate evidentiary basis on which a jury 
could find that Tri-Core and Barrett were not truthful about 
their commissions.  Under the circumstances, it was an abuse 
of discretion for the District Court to refuse to instruct the 
jury that this evidence could constitute a scheme to defraud 
under the mail and wire fraud statutes.
35
 
                                                                                                     
they were undisclosed; that they were significantly greater 
than the amounts that the Plaintiffs anticipated Barrett would 
receive; and that they were disproportionate to not only the 
amount of time that Barrett devoted to the Plaintiffs but also 
to the value of his services.‖  Reply Br. 22.  These facts have 
nothing to do with whether they were excessive by industry 
standards. 
35
 The plaintiffs also argued to the District Court that PTE 84-
24 imposed on Barrett a separate duty to disclose information 
to them about his commissions.  App. 7682.  The District 
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 The District Court‘s refusal to charge the jury on the 
concealed commissions theory was not harmless error.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (requiring reviewing courts to issue 
judgment ―without regard to errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of parties‖).  In instructing the 
jury to disregard the mountain of evidence pertaining to Tri-
Core and Barrett‘s commissions, the court withdrew a large 
swath of the case from the jurors‘ deliberations.  We question 
whether any jury could separate the commissions testimony 
from the rest of the case.  Testimony concerning the 
plaintiffs‘ knowledge of Barrett and Tri-Core‘s commissions 
was intertwined with testimony concerning the scheme in 
general.  We cannot know whether the instruction to ignore 
testimony on commissions infected the jury‘s consideration of 
the plaintiffs‘ other scheme-to-defraud theories.  At a 
minimum, though, it is not ―highly probable‖ that the 
instruction did not affect the plaintiffs‘ substantial rights.  See 
McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 923-27 
(3d Cir. 1985).  We therefore we will vacate the jury‘s verdict 
on the RICO claim and remand for retrial.
36
 
 
B. 
 
The plaintiffs next challenge the damage award on the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim.  They objected to the award in 
their motion for a new trial, which was denied by the District 
Court.  We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion.  Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 532 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
  
The plaintiffs‘ argument is premised on the jury‘s 
alleged confusion with respect to the verdict form.  The 
District Court initially handed the jury a simple verdict form 
                                                                                                     
Court rightly understood PTE 84-24 as supplying an 
exemption from liability for prohibited transactions under 
ERISA rather than an independent duty to disclose.  See App. 
7815.     
36
 Because we have ordered a new trial on the RICO claim, 
we need not consider the plaintiffs‘ argument that statements 
made by Barrett‘s counsel at summation prejudiced the jury‘s 
resolution of the claim. 
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with one line to fill in damages for each group of plaintiffs.  
The following day, the court provided the jury with an 
optional supplemental verdict form that broke down the 
damages for each group of plaintiffs into several line items.  
Over the course of its deliberations, the jury asked the court a 
question, in writing, about the form.  Ultimately, its verdict 
sheet listed one damages sum for each cluster of plaintiffs, 
not broken into component parts.   
 
The plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the basis that 
the verdict form was inconsistent and that the jury awarded 
insufficient damages.  The District Court denied the motion 
on the merits and noted that, in any event, the plaintiffs did 
not timely object to the form of the verdict sheet.  On appeal, 
the plaintiffs contend that because the jury did not fill in the 
supplemental verdict form, they are entitled to a new trial.  
The argument is not well taken.  The jury was under no 
obligation to fill out the supplemental form, and the District 
Court was correct to point out that the plaintiffs‘ failure to 
object timely rendered the argument waived.  We conclude 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining 
to upset the jury‘s verdict on the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. 
 
C. 
 
The plaintiffs next contend that the District Court 
lacked a legal basis for instructing the jury to apportion 
liability.  New Jersey law permits a tortfeasor to request 
apportionment of damages among multiple responsible 
parties.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.2.  An apportionment 
instruction may be given if the trial court determines, ―as a 
matter of law, [that] the jury is capable of apportioning 
damages.‖  Campione v. Soden, 695 A.2d 1364, 1375 (N.J. 
1997).  ―The absence of conclusive evidence concerning 
allocation of damages will not preclude apportionment by the 
jury[.]‖  Id.  Rather, the trial court need only determine 
―whether there is any rational basis for the jury to conclude 
that the respective fault of each defendant can be 
apportioned.‖  Baglini v. Lauletta, 768 A.2d 825, 838 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. 2001).  An instruction may be given even if 
the other tortfeasors have settled with the plaintiff, are 
deceased (like Redfearn), or have declared bankruptcy (like 
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Tri-Core).  Young v. Latta, 589 A.2d 1020, 1021 (N.J. 1991).  
These permissive standards reflect New Jersey‘s policy of 
favoring apportionment among responsible parties.  See 
Boryszewski ex rel. Boryszewski v. Burke, 882 A.2d 410, 
423 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2005).    
 
Barrett requested that the jury apportion damages 
between himself and Tri-Core and Redfearn, both absent 
defendants, for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.  He had 
previously asserted a cross-claim against Tri-Core and 
Redfearn for negligence.  In Barrett‘s view, a portion of the 
plaintiffs‘ harm was attributable to Tri-Core and Redfearn‘s 
negligent misrepresentations about EPIC‘s tax consequences.  
Over the plaintiffs‘ objection, the District Court gave the 
instruction.  The jury ultimately divided responsibility evenly 
between Barrett and Tri-Core/Redfearn (treated as one 
entity), thus halving the damages recoverable from Barrett.   
 
The plaintiffs maintain that neither Tri-Core nor 
Redfearn could be found liable for negligently 
misrepresenting the tax risks of EPIC.  This argument, we 
conclude, is meritless.  As an initial matter, we find no error 
in the District Court‘s legal conclusions.  To prove negligent 
misrepresentation, a party must establish ―‗[a]n incorrect 
statement, negligently made and justifiably relied on, [that] 
may be the basis for recovery of damages for economic loss . 
. . sustained as a consequence of that reliance.‘‖  Singer v. 
Beach Trading Co., 876 A.2d 885, 890-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2005) (quoting McClellan v. Feit, 870 A.2d 644, 
650 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 552 (1965).  Material omissions, too, can 
support liability for negligent misrepresentation if a party has 
a duty to disclose.  Karu v. Feldman, 574 A.2d 420, 426 (N.J. 
1990).  The District Court concluded that Tri-Core and 
Redfearn, the architects of EPIC, had a duty to disclose 
known tax risks by virtue of their special relationship with the 
plaintiffs, ascertainable and predictable members of the class 
of potential investors in the plan.  See People Express 
Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 112 (N.J. 
1985).  We agree.  It was foreseeable that the plaintiffs would 
rely on their representations about the integrity of the claimed 
tax benefits.   
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We also find no error in the District Court‘s conclusion 
that the record disclosed a rational basis upon which a jury 
could deem Tri-Core and Redfearn partially responsible for 
the plaintiffs‘ loss.  Trial testimony supplied a sound 
evidentiary predicate for the conclusion that Tri-Core and 
Redfearn made affirmative misrepresentations or material 
omissions on which the plaintiffs justifiably relied to their 
detriment.  Tri-Core and Redfearn created the brochures and 
marketing materials used by Barrett to promote EPIC, 
materials that trumpeted the tax benefits of EPIC plans while 
disguising their unsteady grounding in the tax code.  All the 
while, Tri-Core and Redfearn knew that there was doubt 
about the deductibility of the contributions made under the 
scheme.  The plaintiffs knew that Tri-Core and Redfearn were 
the architects of EPIC and reasonably accepted their 
representations as made by experts peddling a secure 
investment vehicle.  As we have explained, New Jersey law 
sets a low bar for the quantum of evidence needed to obtain 
an instruction on comparative fault.  See Boryszewski, 882 
A.2d at 418.  In light of this standard, the District Court 
properly granted Barrett‘s request to apportion damages for 
the breach of fiduciary duty claim.  
 
D. 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the District Court 
erred in granting Barrett judgment as a matter of law on their 
claim for punitive damages under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.9 
et seq.  Our review of an order granting judgment as a matter 
of law is plenary.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 
F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  The plaintiffs maintain that 
the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to permit the jury 
to consider whether Barrett‘s breach of fiduciary duty 
warranted punitive damages.  We disagree.  Trial testimony 
did not disclose clear and convincing evidence that Barrett 
acted with actual malice or with wanton and willful disregard 
of harm in recommending EPIC to the plaintiffs.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:15-5.12.   
 
VI. 
 
 We wish to commend the District Court on its 
exemplary handling of this difficult matter.  For the reasons 
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discussed, we will affirm its judgments in all respects but 
three.  We will vacate the District Court‘s partial grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Barrett regarding plaintiffs‘ 
state law claims to the extent that they allege that Barrett 
misrepresented the existence of a reserve fund, the 
availability of conversion credits, and the nature of his 
commissions before adoption of the EPIC plans and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We will 
vacate the jury‘s verdict on the plaintiffs‘ RICO claim and 
remand for retrial consistent with this opinion.  And, insofar 
as it held the Universal Mailing and Alloy Cast plaintiffs‘ 
ERISA claims time-barred, we will vacate the District Court‘s 
partial grant of Barrett‘s motion to amend the judgment and 
remand for further proceedings.   
